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Pleading and Proving Foreign Law in the Age
of Plausibility Pleading
ROGER M. MICHALSKI†
INTRODUCTION
Economic and social globalization has increased the
volume of globalized litigation, with courts in the United
States increasingly called upon to determine questions of
foreign law. At best, pleading and proving foreign law1 in
U.S. courts is confusing and cumbersome. At worst, it is
incoherent and unpredictable. This is not accidental. The
U.S. model draws on two distinct traditions in its approach
to questions of foreign law: an adversarial tradition2 and a
court-centered tradition.3 They do not complement one
another. Instead, they mandate different and inconsistent
roles for the parties and the court. Under the adversarial
model, parties bear the principal responsibilities of pleading
and proving foreign law.4 This model stresses the
importance of party autonomy to judicial proceedings. 5
Under the court-centered model, the court supplants the
agency of the parties in the interest of arriving at the

† Ph.D. University of Michigan; J.D. University of California, Berkeley, School
of Law. For comments on earlier manuscripts, suggestions and feedback, I
would like to thank Judge Wayne Brazil, Professors Richard Buxbaum,
Katerina Linos, and Herma Hill Kay. All remaining errors are my own.
1. The term “foreign law” will be used throughout the Article to denote the
law of foreign nations as opposed to that of sister states.
2. The terms “adversarial tradition” and “adversarial model” will be used
throughout the Article to define the standards of pleaded foreign law in common
law countries, such as England. See infra Part III.A.
3. The terms “court-centered tradition” and “court-centered model” will be
used throughout the article to define the standards of pleading foreign law in
civil law countries, such as Germany. See infra Part III.B.
4. See infra Part III.A
5. See infra Part III.A
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“correct” outcome, independent of the actions and intentions
of the parties.6
Both of these models have much to recommend them.
However, by not making a clear choice between the
adversarial and court-centered models, the hybrid U.S.
approach is running the risk of conceptual incoherence. For
example, U.S. courts have traditionally regarded foreign
law as fact, not law.7 Parties wishing to rely on foreign law
6. See infra Part III.B
7. See Hans W. Baade, Proving Foreign and International Law in Domestic
Tribunals, 18 VA. J. INT‟L L. 619, 619 (1978) (noting that foreign law
traditionally was a fact to be proved by expert testimony); Benjamin Busch,
Comment, When Law Is Fact, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 646, 651 (1956) (noting the
traditional requirement of proving foreign law as a fact); Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Rule 44.1 and the “Fact” Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death
Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 613, 617 (1967) (“AngloAmerican courts and commentators historically have characterized a foreignlaw issue as a question of fact to be pleaded and proved as a fact . . . .”); Arthur
Nussbaum, Comment, Proving the Law of Foreign Countries, 3 AM. J. COMP. L.
60, 60-62 (1954) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Proving the Law] (commenting on the
State of New York‟s shift away from the common law and allowing courts to
“explore foreign law on their own motion”); Arthur Nussbaum, The Problem of
Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1018 (1941) (“During the last century
[treating foreign law as fact] has lost much of its popularity in civil law
countries, but in America and in other common law jurisdictions it still
dominates cases, legislation, and literary discussion.” (footnotes omitted));
Rudolf B. Schlesinger, A Recurrent Problem in Trans-National Litigation: The
Effect of Failure to Invoke or Prove the Applicable Foreign Law, 59 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 3-4 (1973) [hereinafter Schlesinger, Trans-National Litigation] (noting
that American common law doctrines are based on the fact theory); Otto C.
Sommerich & Benjamin Busch, The Expert Witness and the Proof of Foreign
Law, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 125, 127 (1953) (“The prevailing idea under the common
law in England and in the United States has been that foreign law is a fact . . .
.”); William B. Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45
CAL. L. REV. 23, 24 (1957) (“It has previously been indicated that the traditional
common law procedure and practice is to treat foreign law as if it were a fact.”);
Robert von Moschzisker, Presumptions as to Foreign Law, 11 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2
(1926) (“[H]e who claims the foreign law to be different from that of the forum
must prove the fact asserted.”); Robert L. Beale, Comment, Judicial Notice of
Foreign Law, 38 WASH. L. REV. 802, 802-03 (1963) (noting accepted common law
rule was to treat foreign law as a fact to be pleaded and proven); Edwin P.
Carpenter, Note, Presumptions as to Foreign Law: How They Are Affected by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, 10 WASHBURN L.J. 296, 296-97 (1971)
(“American courts have traditionally characterized foreign law issues as
questions of fact which must be pleaded and proved as any other fact . . . .”);
Rudy J. Peritz, Comment, Determination of Foreign Law Under Rule 44.1, 10
TEX. INT‟L L.J. 67, 67 (1975) (“Anglo-American courts and legal scholars

2011] PLEADING AND PROVING FOREIGN LAW

1209

either for defenses or claims had to plead and prove foreign
law like other facts.8 Courts conducted no independent
investigations of foreign law, just as they would not conduct
independent investigations of any other fact that the parties
plead.9 For a time, some jurisdictions took this approach to
its logical extreme, allowing juries to decide questions of
foreign law like other facts.10 This placed important burdens
on parties to properly plead and prove foreign law.11 Failure
to do so sometimes led to dismissal of the action.12 Similarly,
even where foreign law clearly applied to a case, the failure
of a party to raise the issue would lead to the application of
domestic law, whether that made sense or not.13
This regime for pleading and proving foreign law as fact
was massively transformed in 1966 with the introduction of
Rule 44.1 to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.14 Under
this new regime, parties and courts have overlapping and
ill-defined responsibilities to plead and prove foreign law.15
traditionally have defined issues of foreign law as questions of fact.” (footnote
omitted)). See generally RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 32-139 (1950) (discussing techniques of proving foreign law as a
fact).
8. Miller, supra note 7, at 617.
9. Id. at 620-21.
10. See id. at 623 (“The fact characterization of foreign law occasionally was
carried to the extreme of leaving foreign law issues to the jury for
determination.”); Stern, supra note 7, at 25 (noting that at one point in the
history of the common law, foreign law questions were decided by the jury).
11. See Schlesinger, Trans-National Litigation, supra note 7, at 4-5. (“[I]t
follows with logical necessity that a plaintiff who alleges a cause of action
governed by foreign law, but fails to allege and prove the relevant command of
the foreign sovereign, has failed to show one of the material „facts‟ of his case
and thus must lose. The same fate befalls a defendant who fails to allege and
prove the foreign law on which an affirmative defense is based.” (footnote
omitted)).
12. See, e.g., Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 477-80 (1912) (reversing
Third Circuit‟s failure to dismiss where foreign law was not pleaded or proven
properly at trial).
13. See Nussbaum, Proving the Law, supra note 7, at 66 (noting that treating
foreign law as fact is inefficient, expensive, restrictive, places undue burdens on
parties, and can lead to counter-intuitive outcomes).
14. See H.R. DOC. NO. 89-391, at 8 (1966) (adoption of FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1).
15. Id. Rule 44.1 governs proceedings in federal courts. However, it is also
significant for the many state jurisdictions that follow the non-mandatory but
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For example, questions of foreign law are now nominally
treated as questions of law, no longer as questions of fact.16
This suggests that courts are now in exclusive control of
shaping the applicability of foreign law, just as they are
responsible for applying domestic law independent of the
actions and intentions of the parties. And indeed, courts are
now empowered to conduct their own investigations of
foreign law even where no party has raised a foreign law
claim or defense.17 However, parties nonetheless retain the
burden of providing notice to opposing counsel of an
intention to raise a foreign law issue.18 Failure to do so
properly can lead to the application of domestic law, though
courts retain the power to apply foreign law even where
parties do not indicate an intent to rely on foreign law.19 In
highly persuasive Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See John B. Oakley, A Fresh
Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 356-58 (2003) (noting
states whose procedure systems are similar to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure); cf. Roger M. Michalski, Essay, Tremors of Things To Come: The
Great Split Between Federal and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 109 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/10/27/michalski.html (noting
that federal and state pleading standards are further diverging post-Iqbal).
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 (“The court‟s determination must be treated as a
ruling on a question of law.”).
17. See, e.g., Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1999)
(“[Rule 44.1] provides courts with broad authority to conduct their own
independent research to determine foreign law but imposes no duty upon them
to do so.”); McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 871 F.2d 1412, 1424 n.10 (9th Cir.
1989) (“Although the court is permitted to take judicial notice of authoritative
statements of foreign law, nothing requires the court to conduct its own research
into obscure sources.”).
18. See, e.g., Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, New Jersey v. Pac.-Peru Constr.
Corp., 558 F.2d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 1977) (“We choose to apply the law of Hawaii.
None of the parties, pursuant to Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, gave written notice of an intent to raise an issue concerning the law
of a foreign country. We are, therefore, under no obligation to attempt to apply
Peruvian law.”).
19. Rationis Enters. Inc. of Panama v. Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co., 426 F.3d
580, 585-86 (2d Cir. 2005); Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 96 F.3d 216, 221 (7th
Cir. 1996) (“[Defendant] waived any objection to the application of Illinois law
by failing to address the choice-of-law issue earlier in the proceedings.”);
Vukadinovich v. McCarthy, 59 F.3d 58, 62 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[C]hoice of law, not
being jurisdictional, is normally, and we think here, waivable.” (citations
omitted)); Pac.-Peru Constr. Corp., 558 F.2d at 952 (“We choose to apply the law
of Hawaii. None of the parties, pursuant to Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, gave written notice of an intent to raise an issue concerning the
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short, the current regime for pleading and proving foreign
law tries to have it both ways. It insists on adversarial
presentations of fact and law, and it relies on courts to
resolve questions of foreign law independent of the actions
and intentions of the parties.20
This puts both litigants and courts in an awkward
position. For example, a plaintiff that intends to rely on
foreign law faces strong incentives to plead foreign law
extensively or fear dismissal for failure to state a claim.21
However, just how much and what to include in the
pleading is not clear. Should the pleading contain expert
testimony concerning foreign law?22 Verbatim statements of
the foreign law? Analysis of foreign case law? Affidavits
from foreign counsel?23 Including all of these materials could
expand pleadings to the length of treatises on foreign law.
Worse, including such material could amount to the
impermissible pleading of evidence and conclusions because,
after all, the court is responsible for researching,
interpreting, and determining foreign law.24 Also, would
including such material violate the mandate in Rule 8 that
complaints be “short and plain”?25 Stranger still, failure to
plead foreign law properly does not necessarily lead to a
dismissal of the suit (like failure to plead properly does in

law of a foreign country. We are, therefore, under no obligation to attempt to
apply Peruvian law.”); Ruff v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 393 F.2d 500, 502 (2d
Cir. 1968) (“A party must give „reasonable written notice‟ in the district court
proceedings in order to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country on
appeal.”); Prime Start Ltd. v. Maher Forest Prods, Ltd., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1113,
1119 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (“Defendants‟ use of Washington law is a clear
acquiescence by application, and Plaintiff‟s lack of opposition to Defendants‟
citations may be construed as the same.”).
20. See Stephen L. Sass, Foreign Law in Federal Courts, 29 AM. J. COMP. L.
97, 98 (1981) (“[U]nder Rule 44.1, foreign law is a mixture of fact and law.
Indeed, foreign law is a tertium genus, a third category, between fact and law.”).
21. See infra Parts I.B.3, II.C.
22. See Baade, supra note 7, at 641-42 (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of using expert testimony to prove foreign law).
23. For further discussion of means used to prove foreign law in U.S. courts,
see infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
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other contexts) but might simply lead to the application of
domestic law26 even where that is nonsensical.
These pre-existing tensions in the doctrine of pleading
and proving foreign law have now been heightened, perhaps
to a breaking point, by the recent application of
“plausibility” pleading to all civil suits. “Plausibility”
pleading has its origin in Ashcroft v. Iqbal27 and Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,28 two recent United States
Supreme Court decisions that transformed federal civil
litigation by abolishing “notice” pleading29 in favor of the
new heightened pleading regime.30 This change in pleading
standards has had a broad impact on civil litigation in the
United States.31
One area of impact is private international law cases
that rely on pleading and proving foreign law. Under the
26. E.g., Pac.-Peru Constr. Corp., 558 F.2d at 952.
27. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)
28. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
29. The old notice pleading standard was established by Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
30. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim
for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”). Twombly and Iqbal apply to all
pleadings in federal court and pleadings in state courts that follow the federal
model.
31. See, e.g., Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 389-90 (4th Cir.
2009) (equal protection); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969-72 (9th
Cir. 2009) (First Amendment viewpoint discrimination); Lopez v. Beard, 333 F.
App‟x 685, 687 (3d Cir. 2009) (employment discrimination); Maldonado v.
Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir. 2009) (Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process); S.E.C. v. Cohmad Secs. Corp., No. 09-CV-5680, 2010
WL 363844, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2010) (securities fraud); Jennings v. Hart,
602 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 (W.D. Va. 2009) (negligence); Thompson v. Cont‟l Cas.
Co., 602 F. Supp. 2d 943, 945 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (Employee Retirement Income
Security Act); Klayman v. Barmak, 602 F. Supp. 2d 110, 114 (D.D.C. 2009)
(breach of contract); Fraternal Order of Police v. Gates, 602 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107
(D.D.C. 2009) (Administrative Procedure Act); Bahl v. County of Ramsey, 597 F.
Supp. 2d 981, 984-85 (D. Minn. 2009) (disability discrimination); In re Scott, 403
B.R. 25, 31-32 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2009) (bankruptcy); see also Joseph A. Seiner,
The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment
Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1014 (employment
discrimination); A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the PostConley Era, 52 HOW. L.J. 99, 102 (2008) (civil rights); Howard M. Wasserman,
Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 157, 161 (2010) (civil rights).
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new plausibility regime, parties have to allege more than a
“short and plain” statement of alleged illegal activities
under foreign law.32 In addition, they must allege specific
facts and law that allow a court to determine that the
complaint or defense is beyond the realm of the mere
possible.33 It must now be plausible.34 Broad and non-specific
allegations of illegal conduct under foreign law are
insufficient under plausibility pleading.35 Parties that wish
to rely on foreign law thus face ever more incentives to
include more material in their pleadings. At the same time
though, they face the same conceptual and practical
barriers that prevent the inclusion of such material.36
Predictably, this will make it harder for plaintiffs to
survive the pleading stage and gain access to discovery.37
Defendants will find it easier to resist private international

32. Compare Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-58, with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
33. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Mortimer Off Shore Servs., Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Germany,
615 F.3d 97, 104-12 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1502 (2011).
36. See infra Parts I.B.3, II.C.
37. See, e.g., Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire:
What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over
Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1261 (2008) (criticizing Twombly for ignoring
“information asymmetries”); Randy Picker, Twombly, Leegin, and the Reshaping
of Antitrust, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 177 (“Twombly shrinks the domain of
private plaintiffs.”); Wasserman, supra note 31, at 161 (noting that pleading has
become a “significant veto-gate through which all claims must pass”); Brian
Thomas Fitzsimmons, Note, The Injustice of Notice & Heightened Pleading
Standards for Antitrust Conspiracy Claims: It Is Time to Balance the Scale for
Plaintiffs, Defendants, and Society, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 199, 206 (2008) (implying
that Twombly should be set aside); The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Leading
Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 153, 253 (2009) (“[The Iqbal] standard will likely
constitute a substantial hurdle to most types of litigation.”); Adam Liptak, 9/11
Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at A10
(“[Iqbal] obviously licenses highly subjective judgments . . . . This is a blank
check for federal judges to get rid of cases they disfavor.” (quoting Professor
Stephen B. Burbank of the University of Pennsylvania Law School)); Robert L.
Rothman, Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, LITIG., Spring 2009, at 1, 70
(2009). See generally Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8
Pleading Standards on to Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261 (2009)
(suggesting that the interpretation of the heightened pleading standard of Iqbal
may violate the Seventh Amendment).
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litigation and will be in a better pre-trial bargaining
position during settlement talks.
Beyond shifting the balance of power between plaintiffs
and defendants, the new heightened plausibility pleading
standard raises important questions about the conceptual
coherence of the current regime for pleading and proving
foreign law in U.S. courts. If we truly believe in the power of
adversarial norms then parties should be the masters of
their own fate. Their pleadings should shape the legal
action and courts should not be empowered to overcome the
intentions of the parties on their own initiatives.
Conversely, if we truly believe in the power of courts to
arrive at the truth independent of the interplay between
adversarial parties, then it makes little sense in foreign law
questions to threaten parties with dismissals for failing to
meet Iqbal‟s heightened plausibility pleading regime. In the
context of pleading foreign law, positions between these two
polar opposites are not flexible or pragmatic, but simply
incoherent and practically unworkable.
Plausibility pleading as applied to foreign law also
raises questions about the new post-Iqbal pleading regime.
On its face, plausibility pleading applies to all pleadings in
federal court.38 Pleading foreign law is thus included and
subject to a plausibility analysis. This means that the
plausibility standard applies to questions of fact and law.39
It mandates that judges, at the pleading stage, determine
the plausibility of legal interpretations and analyses of
complicated facts long before a factual record is developed
and long before the parties have had time to articulate legal
conclusions. This turns the pleading stage into the
summary judgment stage. It also places particularly
troublesome burdens on defendants who wish to rely on
foreign law. From the moment of being served, they only
have twenty-one days to make factual inquiries, research
and develop foreign law arguments, and serve a responsive
pleading.40 A consistent application of plausibility pleading
38. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly
expounded the pleading standard for ‟all civil actions.‟” (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555-56)).
39. Foreign law is a matter of law for the court to decide, but “[a] party who
intends to raise an issue about a foreign country‟s law must give notice by a
pleading or other writing.” FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1.
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A).
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to foreign law claims is unworkable and usurps the function
of summary judgment motions. Pleading foreign law thus
exposes inherent difficulties under the new plausibility
pleading regime.
Plausibility pleading, in short, sharpens to a breaking
point already existing tensions within the current approach
of pleading and proving foreign law. As a result, pleading
foreign law in U.S. courts may become increasingly
unprincipled, unpredictable, and inconsistent. Instead of
having the best of both worlds, we are stuck with a
conceptually incoherent regime for pleading and proving
foreign law that is inconsistent, depending on whether it
relies on parties or on courts. The same case before two
different judges could thus be handled in very different
ways, with one court applying forum law and the other
foreign law. This raises concerns about the uneven
application of justice.
No scholarship has yet explored the impact of
plausibility pleading on pleading foreign law. The rise of
plausibility pleading thus provides a fresh opportunity to
reexamine doctrinal difficulties with the current regime.
Similarly, scholarship has neglected a comparative
perspective on variation between the regimes that govern
the pleading of foreign law. In combining post-plausibility
doctrinal analysis with a comparative perspective, this
Article offers novel conceptual tools to reveal shortcomings
with the current regime and propose solutions.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the
current approach to pleading and proving foreign law in
U.S. courts. It highlights the tensions between adversarial
and court-centered norms in current jurisprudence and
practice. These tensions are due to conceptual incoherence
that creates unavoidable litigation dilemmas for plaintiffs
and courts. Part II explains how recent changes in the
federal pleading regime have further sharpened these
tensions.
To highlight the tensions within the U.S. regime of
pleading foreign law and explore solutions, Part III turns to
a comparative analysis of the major schools of thought
applied abroad. Most foreign countries either rely on
adversarial norms or court-centered norms when
structuring the pleading of foreign law. The U.S. model
utilizes both approaches. Seeing these approaches in
isolation sharpens an understanding of each and highlights
the dangers of trying to combine them. This Part identifies
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the divergent normative commitments undergirding
different procedural regimes and the practical implications
of these commitments. Understanding from both a doctrinal
and comparative perspective the sources of inconsistency
contributes to focused analysis and clarity. The comparative
approach thus sheds light on the tensions in the U.S.
system and lays the groundwork for potential
improvements.
Part III advocates for a clear choice between the
adversarial and court-centered approaches to pleading and
proving foreign law. Combining these two approaches has
not worked and, this Article argues, cannot work. Either of
the conceptually pure alternatives is preferable (despite
their shortcomings) to a system that combines both and
ends up with the worst of both worlds. A comparative
perspective offers new insights for how to strengthen both
adversarial and court-centered approaches to pleading and
proving foreign law.
I. U.S. LAW ON PLEADING FOREIGN LAW
Courts in the United States traditionally followed an
adversarial approach to questions of foreign law that
stressed party autonomy.41 More recently, reforms have
shifted this approach toward a court-centered regime that
gives courts broad powers to find and apply the “correct”
law independent of the intentions of the parties.42 However,
the reforms did not do away with all facets of adversarial
norms.43 As a result, the current regime for pleading and
proving foreign law is a patchwork of adversarial and courtcentered norms. Often these norms stand in tension with
one another. This Part lays out where they do. The next
Part explains how the recent switch in pleading regimes
from notice to plausibility pleading has sharpened these
tensions.

41. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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A. The Demise of Treating Foreign Law as Fact
Since 1966, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 has
governed the pleading of foreign law in U.S. federal courts.
It reads, in full:
A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign country‟s
law must give notice by a pleading or other writing. In
determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant
material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted
by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
court‟s determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of
44
law.

As the advisory committee notes to the adoption of Rule
44.1 make clear, the rule is intended “to furnish Federal
courts with a uniform and effective procedure for raising
and determining an issue concerning the law of a foreign
country.”45 Rule 44.1, like much of the jurisprudence on this
issue, incorporates both adversarial and court-centered
norms.
The first sentence of Rule 44.1 focuses on notice,
typically accomplished through pleadings. Notice under
Rule 44.1 entails adversarial and non-adversarial elements.
Pleading foreign law requires a party who intends to raise
an issue of foreign law to give notice thereof to opposing
counsel.46 Parties are in control of pleading foreign law and
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1; see also Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423
U.S. 3, 4-5 (1975) (per curiam) (directing federal courts sitting in diversity to
apply state conflict-of-laws rules even when those rules direct the court to apply
the substantive law of a foreign country); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that state conflict-of-laws rules are
substantive for Erie purposes).
45. H.R. DOC. NO. 89-391, at 51 (1966) (advisory committee‟s note on Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 44.1 in 1966 adoption). Rule 44.1 has been
amended three times since 1966. An amendment in 1973 added the reference to
the Federal Rules of Evidence to “free the judge, in determining foreign law,
from any restrictions imposed by evidence rules.” H.R. DOC. NO. 93-46, at 166
(1973). Amendments in 1987 and 2007 were stylistic in nature and did not
affect the substance of the rule. H.R. DOC. NO. 110-27, at 237-38, 541 (2007);
H.R. DOC. NO. 100-40, at 52, 153 (1987).
46. This part of Rule 44.1 resolved confusion within the federal courts prior to
1966 concerning whether Rule 8(a) required that foreign law must be pleaded.
Compare Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955), and
Pedersen v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 95, 97-98 (D. Guam 1961) (not requiring
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alleging that notice was not timely.47 However, courts
typically assess whether notice was substantively sufficient,
independent of the arguments by the parties.48
The second sentence of Rule 44.1 embodies and gives
rise to many of the same tensions between adversarial and
court-centered norms.49 The tools for determining foreign
law seem to focus on the role of the court independent of the
actions and intentions of the parties. Rule 44.1 provides
that courts may sample a wide range of materials and are
not limited by the material presented by the parties.50
Courts may engage in their own research and consider any
relevant material. The advisory committee notes justify this
point by an explicit reliance on non-adversarial norms,
noting that court intervention is necessary and desirable
because counsel might present material “in a partisan
fashion or in insufficient detail.”51 Both of these possibilities
present difficulties to the framework advanced under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel is normally
presumed to act in a “partisan fashion” and advocate for her
side. Similarly, courts are generally disinclined to assist
counsel that present weak arguments or plead with
insufficient detail.52 And indeed, the jurisprudence
foreign law to be pleaded), with Harrison v. United Fruit Co., 143 F. Supp. 598,
599 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (requiring foreign law to be pleaded).
47. See infra Part I.B.
48. See infra Part I.B.
49. “In determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant
material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1.
50. Id.
51. H.R. DOC. NO. 89-391, at 51 (1966); see also 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2444 (3d ed. 2008) (“All
too often counsel will do an inadequate job of researching and presenting foreign
law or will attempt to prove it in such a partisan fashion that the court is
obliged to go beyond their offerings . . . . [I]t must be remembered that one of the
policies inherent in Rule 44.1 is that whenever possible issues of foreign law
should be resolved on their merits and on the basis of a full evaluation of the
available materials. To effectuate this policy, the court is obliged to take an
active role in the process of ascertaining foreign law.”).
52. One exception to this rule is pro se litigation. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (noting that the court holds pro se litigants “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); Erickson v.
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surrounding the tools used to determine foreign law puts
significant burdens and responsibilities on parties in
addition to the court.53 Parties retain the burden of proving
foreign law for claims and defenses.54 Failure to meet this
burden may result in the application of local law, whether
this makes sense or not.55 As one court has reminded
litigants: “It is not the court‟s job to perform the research for
the parties.”56
This tension between adversarial and court-centered
norms inherent in the first two sentences of Rule 44.1 are
also apparent in the third sentence. It mandates that the
court‟s determinations on questions of foreign law be
treated as rulings on questions of law, not fact. 57 Yet parties
are still required to proffer evidence concerning foreign
law.58 Foreign law under Rule 44.1 is then at once an
evidentiary question of fact and a doctrinal question of law.
The adversarial parties are required to present evidence or
risk dismissal—or the application of forum law—yet the
court retains the power to decide questions of law beyond
the evidence offered by the parties.59

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
53. See supra notes 7-20 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
56. Anderson v. McAllister Towing & Transp. Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1286
n.6 (S.D. Ala. 1998) aff’d sub nom. Anderson v. McAllister Towing, 202 F.3d 287
(11th Cir. 1999).
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 (“The court‟s determination must be treated as a
ruling on a question of law.”).
58. Id. (“A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign country‟s law
must give notice by a pleading or other writing.”).
59. The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws is not helpful on this point,
and merely provides that:
(1) The local law of the forum determines the need to give notice of
reliance on foreign law, the form of notice and the effect of a failure to
give such notice.
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Part I.B demonstrates this tension, and traces the three
sentences of Rule 44.1. Part I.B.1 is concerned with notice.
Part I.B.2 examines the role of parties and courts in the
determination of foreign law. Part I.B.3 probes the meaning
and effect of treating such determinations as rulings of law,
rather than fact. In all of these facets of pleading foreign
law, adversarial and court-centered norms mingle uneasily
side-by-side.
B. Tensions: Foreign Law as Fact and Law
1. Necessary Notice. The notice requirement in Rule 44.1
embodies both adversarial and court-centered norms.60 A
party that intends to raise issues of foreign law is required
to give notice to opposing counsel.61 The notice requirement
applies to claims as well as defenses.62 Courts interpret lack
of reasonable notice as a waiver of a “foreign law
argument”63 or as implied consent to an application of local
(2) The local law of the forum determines how the content of foreign law
is to be shown and the effect of a failure to show such content.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 136 (1971).
60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1.
61. Id. (“A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign country‟s law
must give notice by a pleading or other writing.”).
62. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 51, § 2443 (“Notice normally will be
given by the party whose claim or defense is based on foreign law.”).
63. Rationis Enters. Inc. of Panama v. Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co., 426 F.3d
580, 585 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 96 F.3d 216, 221
(7th Cir. 1996) (“[Defendant] waived any objection to the application of Illinois
law by failing to address the choice-of-law issue earlier in the proceedings.”);
Vukadinovich v. McCarthy, 59 F.3d 58, 62 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[C]hoice of law, not
being jurisdictional, is normally, and we think here, waivable . . . .” (internal
citations omitted)); Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, New Jersey v. Pac.-Peru
Constr. Corp., 558 F.2d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 1977) (“We choose to apply the law of
Hawaii. None of the parties, pursuant to Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, gave written notice of an intent to raise an issue concerning the law
of a foreign country. We are, therefore, under no obligation to attempt to apply
Peruvian law.”); Ruff v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 393 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir.
1968) (“A party must give „reasonable written notice‟ in the district court
proceedings in order to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country on
appeal. . . . No written notice that appellant intended to rely upon Liberian law
was given in the district court.” (citation omitted)); Bartsch v. Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155 n.3 (2d Cir. 1968) (“Though new Rule 44.1
establishes that courts may, in their discretion, examine foreign legal sources
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law.64 Courts stress that notice is important, in part,
because it allows opposing counsel to research issues of
foreign law and prepare arguments and evidence.65
Reasonable notice has two components. First, notice
must be timely.66 Timeliness is judged under the
circumstances of the case.67 Courts test the circumstances of
independently, it does not require them to do so in the absence of any suggestion
that such a course will be fruitful or any help from the parties.”); Prime Start
Ltd. v. Maher Forest Prods. Ltd., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2006)
(“Defendants‟ use of Washington law is a clear acquiescence by application, and
Plaintiff‟s lack of opposition to Defendants‟ citations may be construed as the
same.”).
64. See Tehran-Berkeley Civil and Envtl. Eng‟rs v. Tippetts-AbbettMcCarthy-Stratton, 888 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Iranian law could apply,
since the contract was executed and performed in that country. The parties‟
briefs, however, rely on New York law. Under the principle that implied consent
to use a forum‟s law is sufficient to establish choice of law, we will apply New
York law to this case.” (internal citations omitted)). Older cases suggest that in
these circumstances courts simply apply the only law before them. See, e.g.,
Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155 n.3.
65. See, e.g., Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., Inc. v. Ministry of Def. of the
Republic of Venez., 575 F.3d 491, 497 (5th Cir. 2009) (“When the applicability of
foreign law is not obvious, notice is sufficient if it allows the opposing party time
to research the foreign rules.”); Hodson v. A.H. Robins Co., 528 F. Supp. 809,
824 (E.D. Va. 1981) (“The purpose of the notice requirement in Rule 44.1 is
simply to avoid surprise.”), aff’d, 715 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1983), abrogated on
other grounds by Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517 (1988); Grice v. A/S
J. Ludwig Mowinckels, 477 F. Supp. 365, 367 (S.D. Ala. 1979) (notice is intended
“simply to avoid surprise”).
66. See, e.g., Whirlpool Fin. Corp., 96 F.3d at 221 (“The district court was not
obliged to consider [a] belatedly submitted affidavit.”); Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56
F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting consideration of foreign law based on a
party-submitted “affidavit of German law after that court had dismissed the
suit, when the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration”).
67. See, e.g., Stuart v. United States, 813 F.2d 243, 251 (9th Cir. 1987)
(“Absent special circumstances, parties should present issues of foreign law in
their appellate briefs at the latest.”), rev’d on other grounds, 489 U.S. 353
(1989); Hidden Brook Air, Inc. v. Thabet Aviation Int‟l Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 246,
277 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (raising issue concerning foreign law timely under the
circumstances even at summary judgment stage); Thyssen Steel Co. v. M/V
Kavo Yerakas, 911 F. Supp. 263, 266 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (“[Rule 44.1] is not
intended to be a strict time bar to parties attempting to raise a choice of law
question.”); Curtis Mfg. Co. v. Plasti-Clip Corp., 933 F. Supp. 107, 122 (D.N.H.
1995) (Patentee was not entitled to an amendment of judgments where “no
pleadings, motions, or evidence adduced served to notify the court or counsel
that any issue of foreign law was to be litigated”) rev’d on other grounds, 135
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notice, in part, by considering whether it gives the opposing
party “ample opportunity to present its own position.”68
Typically, notice is timely if accomplished in the initial
pleadings,69 though special circumstances might justify
raising foreign law at a later stage in the proceedings.70
Second, notice must be sufficiently detailed. Courts
have disagreed over what degree of fact-specificity will be
enough for parties pleading foreign law. Many have
insisted, consistent with the general notice pleading regime
pre-Twombly, that written notice does not need to be factspecific.71 These courts have emphasized that no high degree
of specificity is necessary because the “function of the notice
is not to spell out the precise contents of foreign law but
F.3d 778 (Fed. Cir. 1998); H.R. DOC. NO. 89-391, at 51 (1966) (advisory
committee notes on Rule 44.1) (“The stage which the case has reached at the
time of the notice, the reason proffered by the party for his failure to give earlier
notice, and the importance to the case as a whole of the issue of foreign law
sought to be raised, are among the factors which the court should consider in
deciding a question of the reasonableness of a notice.”).
68. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 461 (2d Cir.
1985).
69. DP Aviation v. Smiths Indus. Aerospace & Def. Sys. Ltd., 268 F.3d 829,
848 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Although . . . there may be some circumstances in which
consideration of foreign law may be appropriate after trial and on appeal . . . ,
that is not the normal practice consistent with Rule 44.1‟s requirement of
reasonable notice.”).
70. See, e.g., Cunard S.S. Co., 773 F.2d at 456, 461 (motion to vacate order of
attachment); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 207 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (motion to compel); Weiss v. Nat‟l Westminster Bank, PLC, 242 F.R.D. 33,
40 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (notice in response to document requests, requests for
admission, and interrogatories); Krish v. Balasubramaniam, No. 1:06-CV-01030,
2006 WL 2884794, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2006) (motion to dismiss); Ayres
Aviation Holding, Inc. v. Davidova, No. 1:03-CV26-2, 2004 WL 3777539, at *1-2
(M.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2004) (pre-trial conference); Tome Engenharia E.
Transportes, Ltda v. Malki, No. 94-C-7427, 2003 WL 21372466, at *5-7 (N.D. Ill.
June 21, 2003) (motion in limine seeking order recognizing certain principles of
foreign law as controlling); Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Saxony
Carpet Co., 899 F. Supp. 1248, 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (motion for summary
judgment).
71. See, e.g., Rationis Enters. Inc. of Panama v. Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co,.
426 F.3d 580 (2d Cir. 2005); Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Res. Corp., No. 05CV-4837, 2006 WL 399396 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2006); Hodson v. A.H. Robins Co.,
528 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Va. 1981), aff’d, 715 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1983), abrogated
on other grounds by Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517 (1988); Grice v.
A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckles, 477 F. Supp. 365 (S.D. Ala. 1979).
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rather to inform the court and litigants that it is relevant to
the lawsuit.”72 Under this interpretation of Rule 44.1,
parties can successfully plead foreign law when their
pleadings “specif[y] the segment of the controversy thought
to be governed by foreign law and identif[y] the country
whose law is claimed to control.”73 According to these courts,
the notice requirement of Rule 44.1 “falls considerably short
of a requirement that, in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, a plaintiff must allege the identity and substance of
the applicable law.”74
However, notice is not accomplished where the
pleadings are too general. Such pleadings are insufficient
where the pleadings do not provide the opponent with
adequate notice of the foreign law at issue in the case.75 For
example, “[g]eneral references to „international copyrights‟
and „sale in various territories of the world‟” is not
sufficiently specific.76 Thus, courts are under no obligation to
apply foreign law where a party does not assert a specific
foreign law or pleads foreign law only generally.77
Some courts have required more detailed pleadings,
even pre-Twombly. For them, notice in the context of
pleading foreign law is not a pro forma affair. For proper
notice to occur, these courts require more than merely
mentioning foreign law.78 Parties that intend to raise
72. Rationis Enters. Inc., 426 F.3d at 586 (quoting 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2443 (2d ed. 1994)).
73. Phoenix Four, Inc., 2006 WL 399396, at *7 (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 72, § 2443).
74. Hodson, 528 F. Supp. at 824 (quoting Grice, 477 F. Supp. at 367).
75. See Vapac Music Publ‟g, Inc. v. Tuff „N‟ Rumble Mgmt., No. 99-CIV10656, 2000 WL 1006257, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2000) (holding that the notice
requirement was not fulfilled when the complaint did not “provide the
defendants with adequate notice of the foreign law the plaintiff asserts is
applicable to this case”).
76. Id. at *7.
77. See, e.g., Prime Start Ltd. v. Maher Forest Prods., Ltd., 442 F. Supp. 2d
1113, 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (“[W]here no specific foreign law is asserted, the
Court is under no obligation to apply a general body of foreign law to construe a
contract.”).
78. See In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir.
2003) (barring a Korean corporation from raising its Korean bankruptcy
proceeding as a defense to antitrust claims brought by its competitors because it
failed to raise the foreign law issue timely and properly); DP Aviation v. Smiths
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alternative foreign law arguments may do so, but, again,
they must provide proper notice that is sufficiently
detailed.79 Parties have to plead the law applicable at the
time of the lawsuit‟s underlying events and occurrences, not
the law currently applicable in the foreign jurisdiction.80
Normally, it is the responsibility of the party opposing
the use of foreign law to allege that notice was not timely.81
In contrast, courts typically assess whether notice was
substantively sufficient, independent of the arguments by
the parties. Party-driven and court-driven norms thus
mingle uneasily in the notice requirement under Rule 44.1.
The timeliness requirement puts significant burdens on
parties to give notice of intent to use foreign law under a
party-autonomy framework. Similarly, courts at first sight
seem to respect the adversarial nature of notice under Rule
44.1 whether the choices of the parties are coherent or not.82
Indus. Aerospace & Def. Sys. Ltd., 268 F.3d 829, 846-49 (9th Cir. 2001)
(requiring that plaintiff “specifically mention” that forum law and foreign law
“were materially different”). But cf. Grice, 477 F. Supp. at 367 (“[Proper notice]
falls considerably short of a requirement that, in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, a plaintiff must allege the identity and substance of the applicable
law.”).
79. See e.g., Rationis Enters. Inc., 426 F.3d at 585 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e must
resolve whether [plaintiff] waived the foreign law argument by simultaneously
pleading the applicability of English, Swedish, Korean, or Panamanian law, and
not settling conclusively on one body of foreign law. . . . We now clarify that
alternative theories may well suffice as reasonable notice when, as here,
relevant events occurred in multiple foreign locations and legitimately point to
several different applicable bodies of law.”).
80. See, e.g., Pancotto v. Sociedade de Safaris de Mocambique, S.A.R.L., 422
F. Supp. 405, 407 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (noting that plaintiff was injured on a
hunting safari in Mozambique when the country was a territory of Portugal and
thus would have applied the Portuguese Civil Code, and that even though the
country had since become an independent nation, the law in effect at the time of
the wrong would be applied).
81. See, e.g., Thyssen Steel Co. v. M/V Kavo Yerakas, 911 F. Supp. 263, 267
(S.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that plaintiffs‟ notice of intent to rely on foreign law,
which was sent to defendant four months after Court of Appeals remanded case,
and a full three years and nine months after original complaint was filed, was
not barred because the court determined that there was no danger that
defendant would have insufficient time to research the issue, or be unfairly
surprised, especially where the defendant “does not allege unfair surprise”).
82. See, e.g., Carey v. Bah. Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 205-06 (1st Cir. 1988)
(noting that where the parties are silent regarding the application of foreign
law, courts should apply the law of the forum if the forum state bears a
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In contrast, the role of the courts in assessing whether
notice was substantively sufficient undercuts the
adversarial role of the opposing parties. A court can deny
the application of foreign law based on substantively
insufficient notice, independent of the parties‟ intention. A
court can thus apply local law even though both parties
agree that foreign law should govern. Not surprisingly,
courts disagree about the fact-specificity required in the
pleading stage. Some courts put a minimal burden on the
parties. Doing so minimizes the role of courts in judging the
sufficiency of a complaint and allows adversarial
proceedings to continue (at least up to the summary
judgment phase). Other courts required, even pre-Twombly,
greater factual specificity. This increased the role of courts
in judging the plausibility of a complaint. An increased
emphasis on the court correspondingly diminishes the role
of the parties. Even incapable or non-motivated parties can
be shielded from adversarial proceedings by a court that
takes an active role in judging the sufficiency of pleadings.
In short, the jurisprudence surrounding notice of foreign
law in pleadings suffers from important conceptual tensions
between adversarial and court-centered norms. This was
the case pre-Twombly. Heightened pleading standards
under Twombly, as we will see, have sharpened these
tensions further. Additionally, many of the same tensions
pre-Twombly and post-Twombly between adversarial norms
and court-centered norms arise in other areas of Rule 44.1
jurisprudence.
2. Tools for Determining Foreign Law: The Intertwined
and Conflicting Roles of Courts and Litigants. Like the
notice provision in Rule 44.1, the method of determining
foreign law places overlapping burdens and responsibilities
on parties and courts with contradictory results.

reasonable relationship to the dispute and the parties are not attempting to
escape a foreign sovereign‟s policy interests); McNeilab, Inc. v. Scandipharm,
Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (applying local law, in a patent
infringement action, to interpret a licensing agreement which stated that “the
Agreement shall interpreted [sic] according to the laws of the Federal Republic
of Germany,” where “[n]either party refer[red] to German law in any proceeding
before the court except when the court raised the issue at oral argument”), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 95 F.3d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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Rule 44.1 gives courts wide discretion to consider any
relevant material or source when determining foreign law.83
Courts may consider “any relevant material, or source
including testimony,” without regard to whether the
material considered would be admissible under the Rules of
Evidence.84
Judges, in short, are authorized under Rule 44.1 to
undertake any relevant research they desire.85 This is a
sharp departure from long-standing common law rules that
interdicted judicial research on questions of foreign law.86
The court may consider any evidence submitted by parties,
but it is not bound by such evidence or by the testimony of
expert witnesses.87 Courts may even reject uncontradicted
expert testimony and reach their own decisions based on
independent research.88
Courts may thus rely on their own research of foreign
law to any extent they choose.89 When doing so, courts may90

83. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 51, § 2444 (“The judge‟s freedom to
engage in research gives the court maximum flexibility about the material to be
considered and the methodology to be employed in determining foreign law in a
particular case.”).
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1.
85. E.g., Trinidad Foundry and Fabricating, Ltd. v. M/V K.A.S. Camilla, 966
F.2d 613, 615 (11th Cir. 1992) (“The district court may consider any relevant
material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1)).
86. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
87. Chantier Naval Voisin v. M/Y Daybreak, 677 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (S.D.
Fla. 1988) (noting that the court could accept evidence regarding the substance
of foreign law, but was in no way bound or limited by the evidence presented
(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1)).
88. Faggionato v. Lerner, 500 F. Supp. 2d 237, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing
Rutgerswerke AG v. Abex Corp., No. 93-CV-2914, 2002 WL 1203836, at *16
(S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2002)). But cf. Universe Sales Co. v. Silver Castle, Ltd., 182
F.3d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1999) (rebuking district court for not considering
unrebutted expert testimony where the district court did not conduct its own
research as to relevant law).
89. HFGL Ltd. v. Alex Lyon & Son Sales Managers and Auctioneers, Inc., 264
F.R.D. 146 (D.N.J. 2009) (holding that the court may rely on its own research in
addition to any submissions from the parties when considering foreign law
(citing Nat‟l Grp. for Commc‟ns & Computers, Ltd. v. Lucent Techs. Int‟l, 331 F.
Supp. 2d. 290, 294 (D.N.J. 2004))).
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take judicial notice of the “decisional, constitutional and
statutory law” of a foreign jurisdiction,91 or “authoritative
statements of [its] law.”92 This typically involves a court
researching the code of another country and taking judicial
notice of specific features within it.93 However, even though
courts are free to conduct such research, they may deny
application of foreign law where the parties did not give
sufficient direction to the court.94 This is true even for a
foreign jurisdiction whose law is similar to U.S. law and is
easily researched.95
Rule 44.1, as interpreted by the courts, gives judges
wide latitude in deciding whether to consider foreign
evidence.96 Where a particular issue of foreign law has not
yet been addressed by the courts of the foreign jurisdiction,

90. Wachs v. Winter, 569 F. Supp. 1438, 1442 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that
the court is not required to take judicial notice of laws of foreign countries
(emphasis added)).
91. Liew v. Official Receiver and Liquidator (H.K.), 685 F.2d 1192, 1197 (9th
Cir. 1982).
92. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1165 n.2 (C.D. Cal.
2006) (“[T]he court is permitted to take judicial notice of authoritative
statements of foreign law.” (citing McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 871 F.2d
1412, 1424 n.10 (9th Cir. 1989)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 580 F.3d 1048 (9th
Cir. 2009).
93. E.g., In re Fotochrome, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 26, 29-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)
(noting that judicial notice may be taken of articles of the Japanese Code of Civil
Procedure that provides for deposits of arbitral awards in Japanese courts), aff’d
517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
94. In re Petrol Shipping Corp., 37 F.R.D. 437, 439-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff’d
360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1966).
95. See, e.g., Boutin v. Cumbo, 259 F. Supp. 12, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (holding
that an applicable Canadian statute of limitations could be disregarded in view
of a lack of citation of authority).
96. Cf. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
(holding that whether a foreign judgment should be recognized, to a large
extent, is a question about the laws of a foreign nation, and the court has broad
discretion to consider any relevant material or source, including testimony in
determining foreign law, irrespective of whether such materials would be
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence), aff’d, 635 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir.
2011).
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federal courts may predict what the courts of the foreign
forum would determine the law to be.97
The broad discretion courts are given in determining
foreign law means that their determinations can easily
overpower any showing made by the parties. However,
courts are under no obligation to inquire into foreign law
sua sponte—although they may do so.98 The litigating
parties thus will never know, ex ante, to what extent the
court will be involved in determining questions of foreign
law. This creates unclear and incompatible burdens for the
litigating parties.
Even though courts have broad discretion to determine
foreign law, parties nevertheless retain powerful incentives
to litigate the issue of foreign law to the fullest extent and
present ample evidence. The burden of proving foreign law
remains with the litigating parties, just as the burden of
providing notice remains with them.99 Where a party fails to
97. See, e.g., Anglo Am. Ins. Grp., P.L.C. v. CalFed, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1070,
1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that for purposes of federal courts making
determinations of foreign law as a matter of law, if the issue has not been
addressed by courts of foreign jurisdiction, then federal courts must engage in a
two-step process of determining what the courts of the forum state would predict
that courts of foreign jurisdiction would find (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d
994, 1002 n.10 (2d Cir. 1989))).
98. See, e.g., Integral Res. Ltd. v. Istil Grp., Inc., 155 F. App‟x 69, 73 (3d Cir.
2005) (finding that the district court was not required to consider the law of
Pakistan sua sponte); Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir.
1999) (“[Rule 44.1] provides courts with broad authority to conduct their own
independent research to determine foreign law but imposes no duty upon them
to do so.”); McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 871 F.2d 1412, 1424 n.10 (9th Cir.
1989) (“Although the court is permitted to take judicial notice of authoritative
statements of foreign law, nothing requires the court to conduct its own research
into obscure sources.”); Loebig v. Larucci, 572 F.2d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Rule
44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits parties to present
information on foreign law, and the court may make its own determination of
foreign law based on its own research, but it is not mandatory that it do so.”);
Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155 n.3 (2d Cir. 1968)
(“Though new Rule 44.1 establishes that courts may, in their discretion,
examine foreign legal sources independently, it does not require them to do so in
the absence of any suggestion that such a course will be fruitful or any help
from the parties.”).
99. See, e.g., Bel-Ray Co., 181 F.3d at 440 (noting that it is incumbent upon
the parties to “carry both the burden of raising the issue that foreign law may
apply in an action, and the burden of adequately proving foreign law to enable
the court to apply it in a particular case”); Mzamane v. Winfrey, 693 F. Supp. 2d
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meet a burden of proving foreign law, a court may presume
that the foreign law is the same as local law.100
Again, as one court has reminded litigants: “It is not the
court‟s job to perform the research for the parties.” 101
442, 469 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (finding that where the parties do not satisfy both the
burden of raising issues and proving foreign law, the law of the forum will
apply); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 2d 335, 340
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The court may examine a wide array of materials to determine
foreign law, but it is under no obligation to do so if the party whose burden it is
fails to produce sufficient evidence that foreign law applies.” (citation omitted)).
100. See, e.g., Mut. Serv. Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., Inc., 358 F.3d 1312, 1321-22
(11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting application of foreign law because plaintiff “never
offered citations to substantive [foreign] law”); Nameh v. Muratex Corp., 34 Fed.
App‟x 808, 810 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[N]ew York law properly governed the agreement
because [plaintiff], despite advocating application of Polish law, failed to
produce sufficient evidence of Polish contract law to demonstrate that the law of
contract formation in Poland conflicted with the law of the forum state.”);
Fairmont Shipping Corp. v. Chevron Int‟l Oil Co., 511 F.2d 1252, 1261 n.16 (2d
Cir. 1975) (“We have not considered whether choice of law rules would require
application of Dutch law because, in view of the fact that neither party has
suggested that the foreign law would differ from United States law, we are not
required to conduct an independent investigation of foreign law.”); Bartsch, 391
F.2d at 155 n.3 (“From all that appears, it would seem that this first assignment
was negotiated in Germany and that German law would apply in its
interpretation. Since neither party has suggested that German law differs from
New York law in any relevant respect, we have not embarked on an
independent investigation of the matter.”); In re Parmalat, 383 F. Supp. 2d 587,
595 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Where, as here, there is a failure of proof of foreign law,
the court may presume that it is the same as local law.”); Haywin Textile Prods.,
Inc. v. Int‟l Fin. Inv. & Commerce Bank Ltd., 152 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (applying New York law where defendant “has not demonstrated that
Bangladeshi law regarding successor liability is significantly different from New
York law”), aff’d, 38 F. App‟x 96 (2d Cir. 2002); Indep. Order of Foresters v.
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“In
New York, it is required that a party wishing to apply the law of a foreign state
show how that law differs from the forum state‟s law. Failure to do so results in
the application of New York law.”); Riffe v. Magushi, 859 F. Supp. 220, 223 (S.D.
W. Va. 1994) (noting that where parties have failed to demonstrate that
applicable foreign law is different from the law of the forum state, courts apply
local law); Bowman v. Grolsche Bierbrouwerij B.V., 474 F. Supp. 725, 730 (D.C.
Conn. 1979) (“Defendants have filed an appropriate notice that they rely on the
law of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in this case, and now argue that
[plaintiff] has failed to establish the existence of a contract that would be valid
and enforceable under the law of the Netherlands. Neither party, however, has
briefed or produced evidence of the substance or effect on this case of the
Netherlands law. Under such circumstances, the Court will assume that the law
of the Netherlands is the same as the law of Connecticut.” (citation omitted)).
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Depending on the court and judge, the parties might thus be
in complete control of developing foreign law in their
pleadings as part of their claims or defenses.
The evidence of foreign law offered by parties and
considered by a witness or by the parties does not need to be
formally authenticated under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.102 Parties may present evidence and testimony in
a variety of formats. For example, counsel may present
unsworn statements representing their understanding of
foreign law.103 Counsel may also present affidavits that
indicate points of foreign law.104 Such affidavits may be
signed by counsel, foreign counsel,105 or by a party.106
Beyond sworn and unsworn statements, courts typically
consider expert testimony on issues of foreign law.107
101. Anderson v. McAllister Towing & Transp. Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1286
n.6 (S.D. Ala. 1998), aff’d sub nom. Anderson v. McAllister Towing, 202 F.3d 287
(11th Cir. 1999).
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1; see also Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d
1307, 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (holding that whether a foreign judgment should be
recognized, to a large extent, is a question about the laws of a foreign nation,
and the court has broad discretion to consider any relevant material or source,
including testimony in determining foreign law, irrespective of whether such
materials would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence), aff’d, 635
F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2011).
103. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat‟l Bank of Chi., 699 F.2d 341, 343-44
(7th Cir. 1983) (holding that a sworn statement by an attorney is not a
prerequisite to proving foreign law when an issue concerning the law of a
foreign country arises).
104. See, e.g., Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 458 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding an
affidavit of a Mexican attorney concerning Mexican child custody law was an
acceptable form of proof in determining issues of foreign law).
105. See, e.g., id.; see also Wheelings v. Seatrade Groningen, BV, 516 F. Supp.
2d 488, 499 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (allowing for consideration an affidavit from
attorney admitted to Rotterdam Bar that interpreted crew management
contract between owner and agent under Dutch law).
106. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 699 F.2d at 344-45 (holding that, in
determining whether an IRS summons would be enforced, district court could
consider letters, affidavits, and translations provided by defendant on issue of
whether disclosure of information sought would subject bank‟s employees to
criminal penalties in Greece, even if there was no sworn statement by
taxpayer‟s Greek counsel).
107. See, e.g., Winn v. Schafer, 499 F. Supp. 2d 390, 396 n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(holding that the district court could consider opinion of English law expert as to
ultimate legal conclusion concerning shareholder‟s standing); United States v.
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Appellate courts frequently rebuke district courts for not
considering expert testimony.108 Where expert testimony is
considered, the role of expert witnesses is to “aid the court
in determining the content of the applicable foreign law—
not to apply it to the facts of the case.”109 Experts are
typically lawyers or judges, but competent non-lawyers may
also be considered as experts on foreign law.110
Courts are also “free to insist on a complete
presentation [of the issue concerning foreign law] by
counsel.”111 At times, appellate courts have even
reprimanded district courts for not demanding a more
complete presentation by counsel on the issue of foreign law
where parties failed to address the issue of foreign law at all
or in conclusory fashion.112
The parties thus may present evidence and arguments
concerning applicable foreign law. At first sight, these
interpretations of Rule 44.1 respect party autonomy and an
adversarial understanding of pleading foreign law.
Jurado-Rodriguez, 907 F. Supp. 568, 574 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“A court may seek the
aid of expert witnesses in interpreting law of foreign state or international
law.”); see also Curtis v. Beatrice Foods Co., 481 F. Supp. 1275, 1285 (S.D.N.Y.)
(“Expert testimony is no longer an unavoidable necessity to establish the
content of foreign law.”), aff’d, 633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980).
108. See, e.g., Universe Sales Co. v. Silver Castle, Ltd., 182 F.3d 1036, 1037-38
(9th Cir. 1999) (rebuking district court for not considering the declaration of a
Japanese attorney who specialized in Japanese trademark and contract law and
who stated that Japanese contract law, not trademark law, was applicable in
the case at hand).
109. Minebea Co. v. Papst, 444 F. Supp. 2d 68, 182-83 (D.D.C. 2006).
110. See, e.g., A/S Kreditt-Finans v. Cia Venetico De Navegacion S.A. of
Panama, 560 F. Supp. 705, 709-10 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (allowing consideration of
foreign officer of a bank whose interest it was to insure compliance with
Norwegian law even though he was not a lawyer, when his professional position
made him competent to testify as to validity of transaction), aff’d sub nom. Cia
Venetico De Navegacion S.A. of Panama v. Presthus, 729 F.2d 1446 (3d Cir.
1984).
111. Nicor Int‟l Corp. v. El Paso Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367 n.6 (S.D.
Fla. 2003) (quoting Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 44.1 (alteration in
original)).
112. See, e.g., Twohy v. First Nat‟l Bank of Chi., 758 F.2d 1185, 1193 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding that the district court should have demanded more complete
presentation by counsel on Spanish law where plaintiff‟s experts failed to
address the issue and defendant‟s experts addressed the issue in conclusory
fashion).
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However, courts also often consider evidence put on by
parties that is unsworn113 and not cross-examined,114 thereby
undermining adversarial norms and privileging court
authority unguided by the interplay between opposing
counsel.115 No matter how little or much evidence the parties
present, courts are authorized to conduct their own
investigations and rely on them to any extent they see fit.
The division of labor between the parties and the court
in determining foreign law thus is not clearly defined. In
practice, the tools used by courts to determine foreign law
may vary as widely as complete reliance on evidence
presented by the parties in one suit, and complete reliance
on its own research—despite party representations—in
another suit. Potential and actual litigants have no way to
predict how foreign law will be handled in their case. This is
the result of conceptual incoherence built deeply into Rule
44.1.
3. Determinations of Foreign Law are Treated as
Questions of Law, Not Fact. Traditionally, determinations of
foreign law were treated in U.S. courts as fact.116 Prior to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Conley v. Gibson‟s117
liberal pleading standard, courts required specificity in
pleading foreign law, marked by fact-specific, nonconclusory statements.118 This changed with the adoption of
113. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Kalmich v. Bruno, 553 F.2d 549, 555 n.4 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding
that an opinion letter of plaintiff‟s Yugoslavian law expert, although unsworn
and not cross-examined, was relevant to question as to Yugoslavian law and was
properly offered in support of plaintiff‟s motion to alter judgment and properly
considered both in district court and in court of appeals).
116. Miller, supra note 7, at 617.
117. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
118. See, e.g., The Jean Jadot, 14 F. Supp. 161, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1935) (pleading
held insufficient, where plaintiff “failed to plead the substance of the foreign law
relied upon”); Christie v. Carlisle, 11 F.2d 659, 661 (E.D. La. 1926) (noting that
foreign law must be proven by evidence and cannot be pleaded by exception);
Coronet Phosphate Co. v. U.S. Shipping Co., 260 F. 846, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)
(noting that in pleading a foreign law or ordinance, it is not sufficient to state
the pleader‟s conclusion as to its effect, but the pleader must set out the
substance of the foreign law). Some state courts went further, requiring that the
foreign law be pleaded in haec verba. See, e.g., Swing v. Karges Furniture Co.,
131 S.W. 153, 154 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910) (noting that foreign law must be pleaded
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Rule 44.1 in 1966.119 A federal court‟s determinations of
foreign law must now be treated as rulings on a question of
law.120
This puts courts and litigants in an awkward position.
They must present evidence and plead with particularity as
if foreign law was fact, yet their actions (unlike in other
determinations of fact) can always be overpowered by the
courts‟ own investigations. Litigants, in short, have no way
of knowing whether they have to plead with particularity or
not. If they include too little information, they risk
dismissal. If they include too much, they risk interpreting
in haec verba or at least substantially); Minneapolis Harvester Works v. Smith,
54 N.W. 973, 974 (Neb. 1893) (suggesting that it is safer practice to set out in
the pleading a copy of the foreign statute). But see St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v.
Haist, 72 S.W. 893, 894 (Ark. 1903) (“It was not necessary that [the complaint]
set out the Louisiana statute in haec verba in pleading the statute.”).
119. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1; Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 146 F.R.D. 24,
27 (D. Mass. 1993) (“By clearly characterizing the determination of foreign law
as a question of law rather than one of fact as it had previously been treated,
the adoption of Rule 44.1 in 1966 marked a watershed with respect to the
method or manner of proving foreign law.”). Though Rule 44.1. did not impose
any mandatory obligations on state courts, many states mirror Rule 44.1. in
part or whole. See, e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 44.1 (Alabama); ARK. R. CIV. P. 44.1
(Arkansas); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 44.1. (Arizona). Additionally, the Uniform Judicial
Notice of Foreign Law Act (adopted by numerous states) provides for
determination of foreign law to be an issue for the court. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-25-106 (1999) (Colorado); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-38-4-1 to -7 (2010)
(Indiana); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-501(a) to -507 (LexisNexis
2006) (Maryland).
120. See, e.g., Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he
meaning of foreign law is no longer treated as a strict question of fact to be
proved in the same manner as other questions of fact . . . .”); Bamberger v.
Clark, 390 F.2d 485, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that a question of foreign law
is treated in the federal courts as calling for a ruling on a question of law rather
than fact); Anglo Am. Ins. Grp., P.L.C. v. CalFed Inc., 940 F. Supp. 554, 558
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“The court‟s determination [of an issue of foreign law] is
treated as [a] ruling on a question of law.”); Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., Petrobras
v. Ameropan Oil Corp., 372 F. Supp. 503, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“The
determination of such a question [of foreign law] is now treated as a ruling on a
question of law.”). Treating determinations of foreign law as questions of law
rather than fact is also in keeping with a long-standing aversion that a jury is
not equipped to determine issues of foreign law. See JOSEPH STORY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 638 (8th ed. 1883); 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 486 (16th
ed. 1899); 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2558
(3d ed. 1940).
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law and revealing too much about their trial strategy to
opposing counsel. Expanding a pleading might seem safer
but runs the risk of prolixity.
Rule 8 mandates that complaints be “short and plain.”121
Similarly, “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise and
direct.”122 Courts have not defined clear thresholds of
prolixity, leaving plaintiffs to guess when their pleadings
become too lengthy and run the risk of dismissal.123 The
commandments of Rule 8 thus clash with incentives to
include as much material about foreign law in a complaint
as possible. Few complaints are dismissed with prejudice for
prolixity.124 Instead, lengthy complaints are typically
allowed to be modified to conform with Rule 8.125 However,
this does not resolve the underlying tension between
incentives to include abundant factual detail in a complaint
to pass the requirements of Rule 44.1 and incentives under
Rule 8 to write a complaint that is “short and plain.”
Should parties that intend to rely on foreign law for
claims and defenses then include affidavits or expert
testimony in their pleadings? Jurisprudence surrounding
Rule 44.1 provides no clear answer. The wrong decision
means that the plaintiff runs the risk of dismissal, revealing
trial strategy, and self-limiting rights of recovery.
121. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1). Prior to the 2007 changes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the relevant language concerning this provision of Rule 8 was
present in Rule 8(e)(1) and stated that “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be
simple, concise, and direct.” H.R. DOC. NO. 110-27, at 438-40 (2007) (advisory
committee‟s notes on 2007 changes). The 2007 changes in Rule 8 were stylistic
only. Id.
123. See, e.g., Newman v. Massachusetts, 115 F.R.D. 341, 342-43 (D. Mass.
1987) (dismissing a twenty-one page complaint as “argumentative, prolix, and
verbose”).
124. See, e.g., Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Prolixity
is a bane of the legal profession but a poor ground for rejecting potentially
meritorious claims.”).
125. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1217, at 178 (2d ed. 1990) (“Permission to file an amended
complaint complying with Rule 8(a)(2) usually is freely given because the
federal rules contemplate a decision on the merits rather than a final resolution
of the disputes on the basis of technicalities.”). But cf. Rosa v. Goord, 29 F. App‟x
735, 735 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 case where plaintiff‟s
amended complaint remained prolix).
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Beyond the practical concerns of how to plead
successfully, treating determinations of foreign law as
questions of law exposes inherent tensions in Rule 44.1. If
proving foreign law was truly a question of law, then parties
could not determine what law a court applies and how it
interprets such law, just as the actions of the parties in, for
example an ERISA action, cannot change the underlying
and applicable substantive law. Similarly, if proving foreign
law was truly a question of fact, then courts could not
conduct their own investigations just as they are not
authorized to investigate crime scenes or supplement
pleadings with their own knowledge of facts. Pleading
foreign law under Rule 44.1 tries to have it both ways.126
Rule 44.1 relies on adversarial presentations of fact and
law, and it grants courts broad powers to resolve the issues
independent of the actions or intentions of the parties.
Treating determinations of foreign law as questions of
law also impacts appellate review.127 Instead of inquiring
whether determinations of law were sufficiently proven,128
appellate courts now probe whether the determinations of
law were accurate, typically under a de novo standard.129
126. See United States v. Pre-Columbian Artifacts, 845 F. Supp. 544, 546
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (“While any determination as to foreign law is a legal question,
any relevant material or source, including testimony, may be considered in
establishing foreign law.”).
127. See, e.g., Kalmich v. Bruno, 553 F.2d 549, 552 (7th Cir. 1977)
(“Irrespective of the deference to which a district court judge‟s determination of
the local law is entitled, we regard the matter of foreign country law as purely a
„question of law,‟ as it is characterized in Rule 44.1, the resolution of which we
are free to arrive at on the basis of our own independent research and
analysis.”).
128. See, e.g., Remington Rand Inc. v. Societe Internationale Pour
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales S.A., 188 F.2d 1011, 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1951) (considering whether trial court decision was “clearly erroneous”); In
re Estate of Schluttig, 224 P.2d 695, 700 (Cal. 1950) (considering whether there
was “substantial evidence” to support the trial judge‟s decision).
129. See, e.g., Lamour v. Peake, 544 F.3d 1317, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Foreign
law and its interpretation are questions of law, which we review de novo.”);
United States v. First Nat‟l Bank of Chi., 699 F.2d 341, 344 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the determination concerning the law of a foreign country, is freely
reviewable as it is a question of law and not of fact); Liew v. Official Receiver
and Liquidator (H.K.), 685 F.2d 1192, 1195-98 (9th Cir. 1982); Vishipco Line v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 660 F.2d 854, 856 (2d Cir. 1981); Kalmich, 553 F.2d at
552; Ramsay v. Boeing Co., 432 F.2d 592, 599 n.11 (5th Cir. 1970); First Nat‟l
City Bank v. Compagnia de Aguaceros, 398 F.2d 779, 781-83 (5th Cir. 1968); cf.

1236

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

Such a review acts without regard to anything the parties
intended or did when litigating the case. As such it is
another element that undermines adversarial norms when
pleading foreign law.
II. THE EFFECTS OF PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING: SHARPENED
TENSIONS AND PROBLEMS
The tensions between adversarial and court-centered
norms that existed under the pre-Iqbal pleading regime still
exist under the post-Iqbal regime. In fact, Iqbal‟s
heightened pleading130 regime has heightened them.
A. Allocating New Burdens on Parties and Courts
Pleading and proving foreign law imposes burdens on
both parties and courts, which are structurally at tension
with each other.131 Parties have a burden to research foreign
law, plead it, and prove it. However, courts are also
encouraged to find the appropriate law for the dispute at
hand: they may raise it sua sponte and they may rely on
their own research of foreign law to any extent they
choose.132 Party decisions and intentions might thus shape
United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658, 669-70 & n.17 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding
that determining foreign law is a matter of law for a judge to decide under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1—which structurally mirrors Federal
Rule of Civil Prodecure 44.1).
130. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“[O]nly a complaint that
states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”). This
requirement of “plausibility” created a heightened standard of pleading
compared to the old Conley v. Gibson standard. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47-48 (1957) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant
to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all
the Rules require is a short and plain statement of the claim that will give the
defendant fair notice . . . . Such simplified „notice pleading‟ is made possible by
the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures
established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of each claim and
defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.” (footnotes
and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also supra notes 27-31 and
accompanying text.
131. See supra Part I.
132. E.g., HFGL Ltd. v. Alex Lyon & Son Sales Managers & Auctioneers, Inc.,
264 F.R.D. 146, 147 (D.N.J. 2009) (citing Nat‟l Grp. for Commc‟ns and
Computers, Ltd. v. Lucent Techs. Int‟l., 331 F. Supp. 2d 290, 294 (D.N.J. 2004)).
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the use of foreign law. Or they may not. The court can
always overpower adversarial norms to ascertain the
“correct” law to the dispute at hand. There is, in short, no
way for the parties to predict how many of the burdens of
determining foreign law the court will take on and how
many burdens it will leave with the parties.
Plausibility pleading has sharpened this tension
between the allocation of determining foreign law to the
court and the parties. Courts under the new heightened
plausibility pleading regime might be more inclined to hold
parties to a higher standard for pleading foreign law.133 This
raises the burdens on the party that intends to rely on
foreign law. Alternatively, courts might take on this burden
themselves. Courts committed to applying the correct law to
a case might find it less likely that the adversarial interplay
between the parties will accomplish this under the more
difficult to meet heightened pleading standard of Iqbal.
Instead, they might implicitly take on this burden
themselves, thereby further undermining the role of the
parties in pleading and proving foreign law.
Iqbal thus might put a greater burden on parties or on
the courts. This effect could vary from case to case (or
perhaps even different phases of the same case). In one
instance, the adversarial parties might be burdened more
with the task of proving foreign law. In another case, courts
might take on those burdens. This tension, between burdens
placed on parties and the court, existed before Iqbal.
However, plausibility pleading under Iqbal further
intensifies this tension. Heightened pleading pushes the
tension to both extremes, placing more burdens on courts or
parties.
Beyond raising tensions in the allocation of burdens
between the court and parties, Iqbal also unsettles and
intensifies tensions inherent in the allocation of burdens
between the litigating parties. The notice requirements of
Rule 44.1 apply to claims and defenses that rely on foreign
law.134 Typically plaintiffs give notice of their intention to
133. Early cases post-Iqbal suggest as much. See, e.g., Mortimer Off Shore
Servs., Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 615 F.3d 97, 113-17 (2d Cir. 2010).
134. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 (“A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign
country‟s law must give notice by a pleading or other writing.”); See WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 51, § 2443 (“Notice normally will be given by the party
whose claim or defense is based on foreign law.”).
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rely on foreign law in their pleadings. In the pre-Iqbal era,
this placed significant burdens on defendants who had, from
the moment of being served, only twenty-one days to make
factual inquiries, research and develop foreign law
arguments, and file responsive pleadings.135 It appears that
the responsive pleadings of the defendant must now meet
this new heightened pleading standard.136 This significantly
increases the burden on defendants. However, courts in the
post-Iqbal era, just as in the pre-Iqbal era, have the option
to exercise leniency and give the party opposing the use of
foreign law more time to make their arguments.137 Thus,
court-centered norms concerned with finding and applying
the appropriate law to the case at hand have long clashed
with the adversarial norms inherent in a strict application
of pleading rules. Heightened pleading has not eliminated
this tension but exacerbated it.
B. The Application of Plausibility Pleading to Facts and
Laws
Beyond intensifying tensions inherent in the allocation
of burdens between parties and the court, heightened
135. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A).
136. This assumes that Iqbal and Twombly apply to defenses. Currently, there
is significant disagreement among the courts on this issue. For an example of a
court that does not apply heightened pleading standards to defenses see
Holdsbrook v. Saia Motor Freight Line, LLC, No. 09-CV-02870, 2010 WL
865380, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2010) (“[I]t is reasonable to impose stricter
pleading requirements on a plaintiff who has significantly more time to develop
factual support for his claims than a defendant who is only given 20 days to
respond to a complaint and assert its affirmative defenses.”). For an example of
a court that does apply heightened pleading standards to defenses see Palmer v.
Oakland Farms, No. 10-CV-00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *5 (W.D. Va. 2010 June
24, 2010) (“By applying the Twombly-Iqb[a]l heightened pleaded standard to
affirmative defenses, a plaintiff will not be left to the formal discovery process to
find-out whether the defense exists and may, instead, use the discovery process
for its intended purpose of ascertaining the additional facts which support a
well-pleaded claim or defense.”). For a middle path between these positions see
Kaufmann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 09-CV-10239, 2009 WL 2449872, at
*1 (D. Mass. Aug. 6, 2009) (holding that defendants are required to allege a
factual basis only for those affirmative defenses not listed in Rule 8(c)(1)).
137. Cf. Francis v. City of New York, 262 F.R.D. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(court denying defendant‟s request for a sixty-day extension to respond to a
civil-rights complaint, yet granting a seven-day extension instead of finding
defendant in default).
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pleading standards also intensify tensions in the interplay
between pleading facts and law. Under current Rule 44.1
jurisprudence, questions of foreign law are questions of law,
no longer questions of fact.138 This suggests that courts are
in exclusive control of determining what foreign law applies
to the controversy, just as a court would be in exclusive
control of determining what domestic law should apply. The
pleadings of the parties cannot alter that. However, even
pre-Iqbal courts have put significant burdens on parties to
plead questions of foreign law properly.139 Iqbal has
complicated this tension between treating questions of
foreign law as fact or law. A court could hold that Iqbal
simply does not apply to the pleading of foreign law because
that is a question of law, not fact. Under a strict reading of
Iqbal, the parties must plead only facts with particularity.140
The law remains for the courts to determine. However, if we
take Rule 44.1 jurisprudence seriously, then the parties
have some influence in shaping the application of foreign
law through their pleadings. This suggests that a court
could apply Iqbal‟s plausibility pleading regime to all facets
of pleading foreign law: facts and law. Under such a
reading, the parties would have to plead facts and foreign
law with particularity. In short, Iqbal has intensified the
conceptual and practical puzzles surrounding the treatment
of foreign law as questions of law rather than facts. Courts
post-Iqbal may apply plausibility pleading only to facts and
leave the pleading of foreign law untouched. Or courts may
apply plausibility pleading to all party representations. This
ambiguity fuels the pre-existing tensions between
adversarial and court-centered norms inherent in treating
questions of foreign law as law.
C. Expanding Pleadings to Treatises on Foreign Law?
For quite some time, litigants wishing to invoke foreign
law had to balance the degree of specificity in their
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 (“The court‟s determination must be treated as a
ruling on a question of law.”).
139. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
140. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (emphasis added)).

1240

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

pleadings. Under Rule 44.1, a party that intends to rely on
foreign law must present evidence and plead foreign law. If
they include too little information they run the risks of
dismissal or application of domestic law. If they include too
much information they run the danger of revealing their
trial strategy, foreclosing viable theories of discovery, and
increasing the danger of a dismissal for prolixity.141
As noted previously, there is a tension between
pleading foreign law and the mandate to write a concise
complaint under Rule 8.142 Plausibility pleading heightens
this tension. It widens the gap between incentives to include
the bare minimum of information in the pleadings and
stuffing the pleadings with affidavits and expert testimony.
If the pleadings must be plausible and questions of foreign
law are subject to such plausibility determinations, then the
parties have even stronger incentives to expand their
pleadings to the point where they might resemble treaties
on foreign law.
D. More Discretion and Less Predictability
Another tension inherent in Rule 44.1 is the disparate
treatment of foreign law depending on the origin of the law
and the judge assigned to the case. In cases where the
foreign law is written in English, from a common law
country, and is easily available, courts are more likely to
conduct their own research and override the adversarial
interplay between the parties.143 In contrast, in cases that
rely on foreign law in a language the judge cannot read and
originate from a system of law that seems alien to the judge,
courts are far more likely to let adversarial norms govern

141. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (mandating that complaints must be “short and
plain”); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1) (“Each allegation must be simple, concise, and
direct.”).
142. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
143. See Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetière, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 631-33 (7th Cir.
2010) (Posner, J., concurring) (noting that a court‟s preference for overriding
party intentions and actions might depend, in part, on whether the court is
dealing with a “major country” where “a modern legal system” has spawned a
well-developed secondary literature).
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the shape of the proceedings and the determination of
foreign law.144
This discretion is built into Rule 44.1.145 Parties are
burdened by this discretion because it creates
unpredictability in what they will be required to produce in
the pleadings and at trial and what the court will determine
on its own, independent of the parties. A judge‟s degree of
familiarity with a foreign legal system could make the
difference between the judge determining questions of
foreign law herself or letting the adversarial interplay
between the parties determine the applicability and content
of foreign law.
Iqbal has increased the discretion afforded to judges in
determining the plausibility of pleadings. As the Supreme
Court made clear in Iqbal, determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief is now a highly
“context-specific task.”146 The Court instructed district
courts to use “judicial experience and common sense” when
applying Iqbal’s plausibility standard.147 Under Iqbal,
plausibility determinations are thus driven by the
subjective experiences and evaluations of the judge.148
Courts post-Iqbal are thus given greater license to let
their intuitions shape whether to conduct their own
research under court-driven norms or let adversarial norms
determine the content and applicability of foreign law. This
contributes to giving courts greater discretion and making
outcomes less predictable.
144. See Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 586 F.3d 487, 496 (7th Cir. 2009)
(Posner, J.) (noting that courts may rely more on party representations “when
the foreign law is the law of a country with such an obscure or poorly developed
legal system that there are no secondary materials to which the judge could
turn”). This might contribute to reinforcing a Eurocentric and Anglophone bias.
145. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 (“In determining foreign law, the court may consider
any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted
by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” (emphasis
added)).
146. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
147. Id.
148. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern
American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 118 (2009); Wasserman, supra note
31, at 159 (“Iqbal is about increased judicial discretion to inquire into and parse
the details of complaints, almost certainly producing more 12(b)(6) dismissals,
as well as wide variance from case to case, even within the same court.”).

1242

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

E. Early Summary Judgment
Another long-standing tension inherent in Rule 44.1
centers on the adequacy of providing notice to opposing
counsel and the court of an intent to rely on foreign law. 149
Courts have judged the substantive sufficiency of this notice
by a variety of factors. Some have taken the language in
Rule 44.1 literally and just require minimal “notice.”150
Other courts have required much more, even pre-Iqbal. For
these courts, notice is accomplished when a party pleads
foreign law with specificity.151 Courts typically judge
whether notice was substantively sufficient, independent of
the motions of the parties.152 This power gives courts great
influence early in the proceedings by allowing or denying
parties to develop the record and present adversarial
positions based on a foreign law theory.153 Decisions on
questions of foreign law could have a dispositive effect on a
claim (or encourage unfavorable settlements). After all,
deciding which law to apply to a case, local or foreign, could
determine whether the plaintiff has a cause of action and
the extent to which recovery is possible.
149. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 (“A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign
country‟s law must give notice by a pleading or other writing.”).
150. See, e.g., Rationis Enters. Inc. of Panama v. Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co.,
426 F.3d 580, 586 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he function of the notice is not to spell out
the precise contents of foreign law but rather to inform the court and litigants
that it is relevant to the lawsuit.” (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 72, §
2443)); see also supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
151. See In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d 204, 208-09 (2d
Cir. 2003) (barring a Korean corporation from raising its Korean bankruptcy
proceeding as a defense to antitrust claims brought by its competitors because it
failed to raise the issue properly); DP Aviation v. Smiths Indus. Aerospace and
Def. Sys. Ltd., 268 F.3d 829, 846-49 (9th Cir. 2001) (requiring that plaintiff
specifically mention that forum law and foreign law are “materially different”);
see also supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. But cf. Grice v. A/S J. Ludwig
Mowinckels, 477 F. Supp. 365, 367 (S.D. Ala. 1979) (“[Proper notice] falls
considerably short of a requirement that, in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, a plaintiff must allege the identity and substance of the applicable
law.”).
152. For further discussion of notice and the tensions inherent in the U.S.
system, see supra Part I.B.1.
153. See Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d at 209 (“[W]e decline to
allow SKM an opportunity to further develop the record because of its failure to
comply with [Rule 44.1‟s] requirement of reasonable notice.”).
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The court-centered emphasis on judging the substantive
sufficiency of notice under Rule 44.1 thus chafes against the
adversarial norms inherent in pleading and developing a
case based on the interplay between the parties. Again,
Iqbal has heightened this tension. It allows (or even
requires) courts to judge the plausibility of a lawsuit at the
beginning of formal proceedings, long before discovery.154 As
a consequence, pleading evaluations increasingly resemble
summary judgment decisions.155
Challenging pleadings under Rule 12 and moving for
summary judgment under Rule 56 used to be completely
different procedural devises. Rule 12(b)(6) regulates access
to pre-trial discovery while summary judgment controls
access to trial. These different functions dictated,
traditionally, different forms and standards. Under Rule 12,
a party can move to dismiss a case for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.”156 Under the preIqbal standard, pleadings survived a motion to dismiss
“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.”157
In contrast, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.”158 Traditionally this is a high standard. No
154. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“[O]nly a complaint that
states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” (citing Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
155. See Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 17 (2010).
156. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states
a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”).
157. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986) (“The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (“[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged
by „showing‟—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is “an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party‟s case.”); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (“When the moving
party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than
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genuine issue for trial exists if, when looking at all of the
evidence, “a rational trier of fact” could not find for the nonmoving party.159 The nonmoving party need only
demonstrate that there is “evidence from which a jury
might return a verdict in his favor.”160
Plausibility pleading under Iqbal and Twombly erodes
this difference between summary judgment and motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.161 Under both standards,
courts now determine the plausibility of a claim and rely on
their own expertise. In effect, this can turn pleading
evaluations into summary judgment motions. It does so
before parties have time to develop the factual record or
build legal analyses. This difference is crucial and heightens
the tensions inherent in pleading and proving foreign law.
Summary judgment functions to siphon claims and entire
cases out of the system before the court and parties have to
incur the heavy costs of trial. This is justified because the
parties had ample opportunity for discovery prior to a
summary judgment motion.162 Substantiated claims will
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
(footnote omitted)).
159. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. at 587.
160. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
161. See Thomas, supra note 155, at 28-31. For arguments that summary
judgment might be unconstitutional, see John Bronsteen, Against Summary
Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 551 (2007) (arguing summary judgment
is “unfair” and “inefficient”); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 140 (2007) (arguing that summary
judgment violates the right to a jury trial). For arguments that summary
judgment is overused see Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are
the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our
Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1133 (2003)
(questioning the broad use of summary judgment); Patricia Wald, Summary
Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1898 (1998) (“Summary judgment has
assumed a much larger role than its traditional image portrays or even than the
text of Rule 56 would indicate, to the point where fundamental judgments about
the value of trials and especially trials by jury may be at stake.”). But see
Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment is Constitutional, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1625-51,
(2008) (arguing, using a historical perspective, that summary judgment does not
violate the Seventh Amendment); Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of
Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 861, 863, 906 (2007) (arguing that motions for summary judgment
have not increased as dramatically as many presume).
162. See, e.g., Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 326 (“The parties had conducted
discovery, and no serious claim can be made that respondent was in any sense
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survive summary judgment; unsubstantiated claims will
not. However, at the pleading stage many parties have only
a partially developed factual record. 163 Often, they cannot
plead with particularity facts that are under the defendant‟s
control.164
Courts, under Iqbal, thus have more discretion to judge
the adequacy of a claim that relies on foreign law prior to
discovery. They have to determine whether the claim is
sufficiently strong to warrant access to court-sanctioned
discovery. This widens the gap between different standards
for judging whether notice is substantively adequate under
Rule 44.1. This gap creates tensions for courts and litigating
parties and increases the unpredictability of the outcome.
F. The Role of Experts
The contested and conflicted role of experts in proving
foreign law further illustrates the tensions created by a comingling of court-centered and adversarial norms. When
considering the content of foreign law, courts may consider
expert testimony submitted by the parties.165 However, they
are not limited to submissions by the parties. Courts “may
consider any relevant material or source, including
testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.”166
„railroaded‟ by a premature motion for summary judgment.”); Int‟l Shortstop,
Inc. v. Rally‟s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1267 (5th Cir. 1991) (granting the nonmovant additional time under Rule 56(f) because “the district court should be
generous in its allowance of discovery requests aimed at uncovering evidence of
the moving party‟s state of mind”).
163. See generally Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Presuit Discovery,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 43 (2010) (exploring pre-suit discovery as a possible
response to Iqbal).
164. For example, many plaintiffs in employment discrimination suits under
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006), must establish an employer‟s discriminatory
intent. See, e.g., Gilhooly v. UBS Securities, LLC, 772 F. Supp. 2d 914, 915-17
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (dismissing complaint that failed to plead facts to support a
plausible inference of discriminatory intent). Without the benefit of discovery,
these plaintiffs find it difficult to plead this element with particularity. See
Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 136-37 (2010)
(“Establishing an employer‟s discriminatory intent in a case can be the most
difficult hurdle for the employee to overcome.”).
165. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1.
166. Id.
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Sometimes courts lean heavily on expert testimony as
submitted by adversarial party presentations to determine
the content of foreign law. Sometimes they do not, instead
relying predominantly on their own research.
Recently, some courts have explicitly rejected the use of
experts as undesirable aspects of the party-driven approach
to foreign law questions. The complex interplay between
adversarial and court-centered norms is well-illustrated by
a web of divergent and overlapping rationales in two recent
Seventh Circuit opinions.
In Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetière, Inc., the Seventh
Circuit discounted expert testimony because it “adds an
adversary‟s spin” to questions of foreign law.167 The court
declared that “published sources” do not have this danger.168
Print material, researched by the court independent of the
parties, thus has a claim to be “objective” that is preferable
“to the parties‟ declarations.”169
In the same case, Judge Posner provided a more
ambiguous analysis as to when courts should take the lead
in determining questions of foreign law. He filed a
concurring opinion to “express emphatic support for, and
modestly to amplify, the court‟s criticism of a common and
authorized but unsound judicial practice.”170 The practice is
that “of trying to establish the meaning of a law of a foreign
country
by
testimony
or
affidavits
of
expert
witnesses . . . .”171 Judge Posner argued that expert
testimony is inherently unreliable because experts are “paid
for their testimony.”172 They are “selected on the basis of the
convergence of their views with the litigating position of the
client, or their willingness to fall in with the views urged
upon them by the client.”173 Language barriers, according to
this argument, should not deter a court from conducting its

167. 621 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2010).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 631 (Posner, J., concurring).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 633.
173. Id.
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own research.174 However, Judge Posner allowed that this
preference for court-driven inquiries might only apply if the
court is dealing with a “major country” that “has a modern
legal system.”175 The case for court-driven inquiries is also
stronger where there is a well-developed (English)
literature on that country‟s laws.176
In the same case, Judge Wood filed a concurrence to
express her disagreement with the court‟s view that expert
testimony is “categorically inferior to published, Englishlanguage materials.”177 Judge Wood argued that given the
difficulties of understanding the nuances in the foreign law,
experts can efficiently help the court,178 which is fully
capable of testing the objectivity of the experts.179 This view
of experts provided by parties does not necessarily advocate
them as integral to an adversarial presentation of facts and
interpretations. Instead, it justifies experts only insofar as
to provide the court with insights and nuances of foreign
law that might be missed through review of written sources
alone.180
Similarly, in Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., the
outcome of the case depended on the meaning of a Japanese
technical legal term.181 There, the Seventh Circuit
emphasized that “judges are experts on law” and should
undertake their own research independent of experts.182 The
174. Id. (“[O]ur
provincialism.”).

linguistic

provincialism

does

not

excuse

intellectual

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 638 (Wood, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 638-39 (“Exercises in comparative law are notoriously difficult,
because the U.S. reader is likely to miss nuances in the foreign law, to fail to
appreciate the way in which one branch of the other country‟s law interacts with
another, or to assume erroneously that the foreign law mirrors U.S. law when it
does not.”).
179. Id. at 639 (“It is hard to see why the [expert‟s] views cannot be tested in
court, to guard against the possibility that he or she is just a mouthpiece for one
party.”).
180. Id. (“It will often be most efficient and useful for the judge to have before
her an expert who can provide the needed precision on the spot, rather than
have the judge wade through a number of secondary sources.”).
181. 586 F.3d 487, 495 (7th Cir. 2009).
182. Id. at 496.
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court considered reliance on paid witnesses as “spoon
feed[ing] judges” foreign law.183 However, it also allowed
that such a practice is justifiable in instances “when the
foreign law is the law of a country with such an obscure or
poorly developed legal system that there are no secondary
materials to which the judge could turn.”184
How responsibilities for developing questions of foreign
law are divided between courts and parties thus remains an
open question. Some jurists, including Judges Posner and
Easterbrook,185 urge courts to take on a greater role, while
others are skeptical of a court‟s ability to do so reliably.
Even staunch critics of the adversarial model, however,
allow for a greater role for parties where the foreign law is
obscure or difficult to ascertain through English-language
sources.
These cases illustrate the tensions built into Rule 44.1
which arise out of the comingling of court-centered and
adversarial norms. The U.S. model tries to have it both
ways: it tries to rely on the adversarial interplay of parties
to shape the applicability and content of foreign law and it
relies on court-centered norms to ascertain that the correct
law is applied to the controversy at hand. These two
approaches can yield different results. They also suggest
different procedural approaches. As illustrated above, the
instability created by conflicting procedural approaches to
questions of foreign law contributes to uncertainty,
unpredictability, and unfair results. The new heightened
pleading regime exacerbates these tensions.
III. A COMPARATIVE VIEW ON ADVERSARIAL AND COURTCENTERED REGIMES
This Part utilizes a comparative approach to shed light
on the U.S. pleading regime and lay the groundwork for
potential improvements. It finds that most countries either
rely on adversarial norms or court-centered norms when
structuring the pleading of foreign law. In adversarial
systems, courts may only consider questions of foreign law if
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Judge Easterbrook wrote the majority opinion in La Cafetière. La
Cafetière, 621 F.3d at 624.
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the parties plead them.186 In court-driven systems, the
courts are obligated to apply foreign law where appropriate
even if no party pleads it and the parties never intended to
apply foreign law to this dispute.187 Similarly, in adversarial
systems, judges rely on the representations of the parties
concerning the content of foreign law, where it is treated as
fact.188 Courts in adversarial systems are typically
prohibited from conducting their own research.189 In
contrast, in court-driven systems foreign law is a question of
law, and judges are authorized or obligated to conduct their
own research to ascertain the applicability and content of
foreign law.190
The U.S. model utilizes both approaches. Seeing these
approaches in isolation sharpens an understanding of each
and the dangers of trying to combine them.
Unlike when courts face questions of jurisdiction (for
example in the European Union under the Brussels
Regulation191), there are no international treaties that
govern when a court must apply foreign law or determine
how to ascertain the content of the foreign law.192 Some
European courts have suggested that the Rome Convention
governs the procedure for pleading foreign law in contract
186. See O. KAHN-FREUND, GENERAL PROBLEMS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
276-77 (1976); MARTIN WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 208 (2d ed. 1950);
Stephen L. Sass, Foreign Law in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Survey, 16 AM.
J. COMP. L. 332, 338-40 (1968); see also infra Part III.A.
187. See SOFIE GEEROMS, FOREIGN LAW IN CIVIL LITIGATION 50-52 (2004); KAHNFREUND, supra note 186, at 276-77; WOLFF, supra note 186, § 207; see also infra
Part III.B.
188. See KAHN-FREUND, supra note 186, at 276-77; WOLFF, supra note 186, §
208; Sass, supra note 186, at 338-40.
189. See KAHN-FREUND, supra note 186, at 276-77; WOLFF, supra note 186, §
208; Sass, supra note 186, at 338-40.
190. See GEEROMS, supra note 187, at 50-52; KAHN-FREUND, supra note 186, at
276-77; WOLFF, supra note 186, § 207.
191. Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC).
192. See, e.g., Convention of the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations
80/934, tit. 2, art. 3, § 1, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1 (EC) [hereinafter 1980 Rome
Convention] (“A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.”);
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters 88/892, tit. 2, § 2, art. 5, 1988 O.J. (L 319) (EC).
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cases throughout the Union.193 Other courts have disagreed
even with this narrow attempt of standardization.194
In the absence of clear overarching regulations,
countries have developed and refined the adversarial and
court-centered models of pleading and proving foreign law.
In this Part, I focus on the regimes in Germany and France
as representative systems of the court-centered model and
on England as an example of the adversarial model.195 The
fundamental procedural differences in these countries
reflect, in part, notably divergent normative commitments.
A. The Adversarial Model
1. England. England is one of the purest examples of a
court system that relies on adversarial norms in pleading
and proving foreign law. In England, questions of foreign
law are questions of fact.196 This is a legal fiction. Foreign
law, after all, is law, not fact.197 However, courts have found
193. See 1980 Rome Convention, supra note 192, tit. 1, art. 1, § 1 (“The rules of
this Convention shall apply to contractual obligations in any situation involving
a choice between the laws of different countries.”).
194. Trevor C. Hartley, Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law: The Major
European Systems Compared, 45 INT‟L & COMP. L.Q. 271, 290-91 (1996) (arguing
that the Rome convention does not apply to rules of “evidence and procedure”
and are therefore inapplicable to questions of pleading or proving foreign law).
195. For example, questions of pleading and proving foreign law are treated in
Austria, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries roughly like
in Germany. See Carlos Esplugues et al., General Report on the Application of
Foreign Law by Judicial and Non-Judicial Authorities, in APPLICATION OF
FOREIGN LAW 3, 10 (Carlos Esplugues et al. eds., 2011). Spain used to follow the
English approach until recently. See New Spanish Code of Civil Procedure (Ley
de Enjunciamento Civil) (enacted January 1, 2000) (effective January 8, 2001).
196. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (Ct. Com. Pl.) 1028; see also
Elizabeth B. Crawford & Janeen M. Carruthers, United Kingdom, in
APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW, supra note 195, at 391, 391-93; Hartley, supra
note 194, at 282-85.
197. English courts seem to recognize this tension to some degree. In appellate
proceedings, English appellate courts are usually bound by the factual findings
of the lower courts. Crawford & Carruthers, supra note 196, at 393 (“In
England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, an appellate court always is slow to
interfere with a trial court‟s finding of fact . . . .”); Hartley, supra note 194, at
284 (“Appellate courts in England are reluctant to interfere with findings of fact
made by the trial judge.”). However, as far as foreign law is concerned, appellate
courts may overrule a judgment on the ground that the lower court erred in its
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it useful to treat foreign law as fact for evidentiary
reasons.198 Treating foreign law as fact allows the
application of a regime of proof that favors adversarial
norms.
Consistent with these norms, parties bear the principal
burden of raising and proving foreign law. Pleading foreign
law is entirely party-driven.199 A party that intends to rely
on foreign law must plead it in the same way as any other
fact.200 If neither party pleads foreign law then the court will
not consider it, however clear the foreign element may be.201
The choice of whether to introduce foreign law arguments,
therefore, rests entirely with the parties. The judge does not
have the obligation nor the power to raise foreign law sua
sponte.202 For example, in one famous English case, the
parties were arguing over a contract that contained an
express and clear governing law provision.203 That provision
specified that Dutch law should govern this dispute.204
However, neither party invoked Dutch law in their

use of foreign law. See, e.g., DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
¶ 9-010, at 256 (Sir Lawrence Collins et al. eds., 14th ed. 2006) [hereinafter
DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS].
198. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (Ct. Com. Pl.) 1028 (“The
way of knowing foreign law is, by admitting them to be proven as facts, and the
Court must assist the jury in ascertaining what law is.”).
199. In England, pleadings are sometimes referred to as “statement of the
case.” See, e.g., Supreme Court of England and Wales County Courts: The Civil
Procedure Rules 1998 (No. 3132 (L.17)).
200. See, e.g., DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 197, ¶ 9-003, at 256.
201. Hartley, supra note 194, at 282-83 (“[F]oreign law is treated as a question
of fact. If it is not pleaded by a party, the court will not apply it, even if it would
appear to be applicable according to the relevant choice of law rule.”).
202. See, e.g., Fremoult v. Dedire, (1718) 24 Eng. Rep. 458 (Ch.) 459; see also
Ascherberg, Hopwood & Crew Ltd. v Casa Musicale Sonzogno di Pietro Ostali
S.N.C., (1971) 1 W.L.R. 1128 (C.A.) 1131; Crawford & Carruthers, supra note
196, at 391 (“A UK court generally does not take notice of foreign law; the judge
is treated as neither knowing, nor being able to know of his own volition, the
content of the foreign law to be applied, and cannot investigate and apply
foreign law ex officio.”).
203. Aluminium Industrie Vaassen B.V. v. Romalpa Aluminium Ltd., (1976) 1
W.L.R. 676 (C.A.).
204. Id. at 684.
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pleadings.205 The English court thus decided the dispute
entirely based on English domestic law without reference to
Dutch law.206
Beyond notice of a foreign law element, the parties are
also responsible for providing evidence of the foreign law as
fact. Unless the other party stipulates to the foreign law, it
must be proven by the party who pleads it.207 The judge
relies entirely on the parties for evidence concerning the
content of the applicable foreign law.208
Parties may utilize a broad range of methods to prove
foreign law, including expert witnesses. 209 Such experts may
refer to the foreign sources of law.210 If experts disagree
about the content of a foreign statute or case the court must
resolve the issue.211 However, the court is not authorized to
independently research foreign sources of law that have not
been introduced by the parties.212
2. Australia. Like most common law jurisdictions,
Australia largely follows the British adversarial approach to
pleading and proving foreign law. Under Australian law,
foreign law is a question of fact.213 It is presumed to be the
same as the law of the forum.214 The parties that wish to
rely on foreign law and claim that it differs from local law
bear the burden of proving the content of foreign law.215 To
do so they must “plead foreign law relied on in [a] claim or
defence [and] give full particulars of the precise statute,
205. Id. at 687-88.
206. Id.
207. Hartley, supra note 194, at 282-83.
208. Id. (“[F]oreign law is treated as a question of fact. If it is not pleaded by a
party, the court will not apply it, even if it would appear to be applicable
according to the relevant choice of law rule.”).
209. Id. at 283.
210. Id. at 284.
211. Id.
212. Bumper Dev. Corp. v. Comm‟r of Police of Metropolis (1991) 1 W.L.R.
1362 (C.A.), rev’d.
213. James McComish, Pleading and Proving Foreign Law in Australia, 31
MELB. U.L. REV. 400, 415 (2007).
214. Id. at 431-40.
215. Id.
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code, rule, regulation, ordinance or case law relied on, with
the material section, clauses or provisions thereof.”216 The
parties do not need to plead the evidence by which foreign
law will be proven or plead particular interpretations of
foreign law.217 Foreign law is a question of fact eventually to
be proven by expert witnesses.218 Under recent Australian
decisions, the pleading and proof of foreign law now extends
to encompass foreign choice of law rules in addition to
foreign substantive law.219
An Australian court recently highlighted the
adversarial foundations of the Australian approach to
pleading foreign law:
It is for the parties and their advisers to decide the ground upon
which their battle is to be fought. The trial is not an inquisition
into the content of relevant foreign law any more than it is an
inquisition into other factual issues that the parties tender for
220
decision by the court.

The court continued, “this is adversarial litigation, and the
outcome of such litigation is commonly influenced by the
way in which the parties have chosen to conduct their
respective cases. Decisions about such conduct may have
been based on tactical and other considerations which are
unknown to a trial judge or an appellate court.”221 Adhering
to adversarial norms implies deferring to such decisions,
whether they lead to the application of the correct law to the
facts or not. Party autonomy, under the adversarial model,
trumps accuracy.
B. The Court-Driven Model
Most European countries reject the adversarial model
espoused by England and other common law countries.
216. Regie Nationale Renault v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491, 517-18 (Austl.).
217. McComish, supra note 213, at 408-12.
218. Id. at 427-29.
219. See Neilson v Overseas Projects Corp. of Victoria Ltd. (2005) 233 CLR 331,
387-88 (Austl.).
220. Id. at 370.
221. Id. at 338.
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Instead of relying on the parties to plead and prove foreign
law, they place the principal responsibility on courts to find
and apply foreign law correctly, independent of the actions
and intentions of the parties.
1. Germany. Under German procedures, foreign law is
treated as law, not fact.222 Courts, if aware of a foreign law
claim or defense, must apply foreign law independent of the
intentions and actions of the parties.223 If a German conflictof-laws rule refers to foreign law then it must be applied by
the court.224 The pleadings of the parties are largely
irrelevant to this determination.225 For example, the
German rules of civil procedure (“Zivilprozessordnung”)
explain that courts are not limited by the pleadings of the
parties or their evidence.226
222. See Ivo Bach & Urs Peter Gruber, Austria and Germany, in APPLICATION
FOREIGN LAW, supra note 195, at 101, 101-113; John Brown, 44.1 Ways to
Prove Foreign Law, 9 MAR. LAWYER 179, 184 & n.33 (1984) (noting that
Germany favors an “active approach” that “require[s] the judge to raise, on his
own motion, the applicability of foreign law and to research the issue to the
extent possible”); Hartley, supra note 194, at 273 (noting that in Germany
“foreign law is regarded as law, its application is determined ex officio by the
court and its proof is in principle a matter for the court”); George Yates, Foreign
Law Before Domestic Tribunals, 18 VA. J. INT‟L L. 725, 728-29 & n.19 (1977).
OF

223. See Menashe Shava, Proof of Foreign Law in Israel: A Comparative
Study, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT‟L L. & POL. 211, 219 (1984) (“The German approach
requires the judge to make every effort to ascertain the pertinent foreign law by
referring to all appropriate sources . . . .”); see also Bach & Gruber, supra note
222, at 101-03.
224. Bach & Gruber, supra note 222, at 101-02.
225. Id. at 105.
226. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Dec. 9, 1950,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBI] 80, as amended, § 293 (“Das in einem anderen
Staat geltende Recht, die Gewohnheitsrechte und Statuten bedürfen des
Beweises nur insofern, als sie dem Gericht unbekannt sind. Bei Ermittlung
dieser Rechtsnormen ist das Gericht auf die von den Parteien beigebrachten
Nachweise nicht beschränkt; es ist befugt, auch andere Erkenntnisquellen zu
benutzen und zum Zwecke einer solchen Benutzung das Erforderliche
anzuordnen.”) (“Proof of the applicable law of another state, including
customary law and statutes, is only required insofar as it is not known to the
court. The court is not limited in ascertaining foreign law to the submissions of
the parties. The court is authorized to use other sources to ascertain foreign
law.”). Notice, however, that courts must notify the parties that German private
international law points to a foreign law if the parties were previously not
aware of this. ZPO § 139(2) (“Auf einen Gesichtspunkt, den eine Partei
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Similarly, the task of ascertaining the content of foreign
law rests with the court.227 Courts may utilize a broad range
of means to ascertain foreign law.228 One tool at the court‟s
disposal is to ask the parties for assistance.229 If both the
plaintiff and defendant are nationals of the foreign country
in question and they agree that the law of that foreign
country applies to the case at hand, then the court may, in
its discretion, accept this view without further inquiries.230
Similarly, both parties may agree that German law applies
and courts may, again in their own discretion, follow this
stipulation or conduct their own research.231 Where both
parties plead only German law, courts often regard this as
an implicit choice of German law (though, again, courts are
not bound by this choice).232
More commonly, parties have little input into questions
of foreign law.233 Instead, courts conduct their own
erkennbar übersehen oder für unerheblich gehalten hat, darf das Gericht,
soweit nicht nur eine Nebenforderung betroffen ist, seine Entscheidung nur
stützen, wenn es darauf hingewiesen und Gelegenheit zur Äußerung dazu
gegeben hat.”) (“The court may base an opinion only on material points that the
court pointed out to the parties and gave them opportunity to comment
assuming that they were not aware of the material point to begin with.”).
227. Burkhard Bastuck & Burkard Gopfert, Admission and Presentation of
Evidence in Germany, 16 LOY. L.A. INT‟L & COMP. L. REV. 609, 622 (1994)
(“German courts have the duty to determine the applicable foreign law.”); see
also ZPO § 293.
228. Bach & Gruber, supra note 222, at 105-07.
229. See id.; Hartley, supra note 194, at 275 (“[The Court] may ask the parties
for assistance, particularly if they have access to the relevant information.”);
Shava, supra note 223, at 219 (noting that the judge may ascertain foreign law
by “all appropriate sources” including “the parties themselves”).
230. See RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET
MATERIALS 61-63, 224-25 (5th ed. 1988).

AL.,

COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT,

231. This situation typically arises in the fields of contract and tort where
courts recognize an increased degree of party autonomy even though, here as
elsewhere, that autonomy is very limited. See Hartley, supra note 194, at 276
(noting the special rules for contract and tort questions).
232. See Hartley, supra note 194, at 275 (“If both parties are nationals of the
country in question and agree on what the foreign law is, the court may accept
their view without further investigation, though it is not bound to do so.”
(footnote omitted)).
233. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 222, at 184 & n.33 (noting that the judge
must “raise, on his own motion, the applicability of foreign law”). There is one
slight complication to this general rule: while a court may renounce any
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investigation of the foreign law in question or consult
directly with an expert.234 If the court relies on an expert, it
will call for an expert opinion (“Gutachten”).235 The expert
providing such an opinion is often given full access to the
records of the case.236 Based on this information, the expert
does not only answer broad questions of foreign law but
often also suggests how the law applies to the fact at hand
(or that, alas, it does not).237 The expert opinion is not
binding on the court, though it is normally followed.238 The
court‟s ultimate assessment of the application of foreign law
thus is often made twice removed from the parties.
Beyond their own research and the use of an expert
opinion, courts may also consult with a German or foreign
diplomatic mission to ascertain foreign law, informally ask
foreign lawyers for information, or inquire with comparative
law institutes (typically situated at universities).239
The role of the parties in pleading or proving foreign
law in Germany is thus marginal. Parties do not bear the
burden to raise or prove foreign law, and the court may
simply disregard the evidence they offer, the law they
suggest, and the admissions they make.

procedure of taking evidence and rely exclusively on the court‟s own
investigation of foreign law, once that court does allow evidence, the court is no
longer allowed to reject expert opinions offered by the parties but must consider
such opinions in its reasoning. See Bach & Gruber, supra note 222, at 103. See
generally ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Dec. 9, 1950,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBI] 53-54, as amended, §404-411 (regulating the use of
experts in judicial proceedings).
234. See ZPO §404-411; Bach & Gruber, supra note 222, at 105-06 (explaining
that a judge is obligated to determine the content of foreign law, but the judge
may rely on auxiliary means, including expert testimony, to do so).
235. See ZPO §404-411; Bach & Gruber, supra note 222, at 106-07 (explaining
process of obtaining an expert opinion in Germany).
236. See ZPO §404-411; Bach & Gruber, supra note 222, at 107 (“Usually, the
court will send the entire case to the expert.”).
237. See ZPO §404-411.
238. See ZPO §404-411; cf. Bach & Gruber, supra note 222, at 107 (“Where a
court has obtained an expert opinion, it may rely on that opinion as long as the
opinion is not manifestly inconistent.”).
239. See Hartley, supra note 194, at 275-76.
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2. Austria and Switzerland. Both Austria and
Switzerland largely follow the German approach, with only
minor variations.
In Austria, raising and proving foreign law is governed
by the Austrian International Private Law Act of 1978.240
Under it, courts are instructed to determine foreign law sua
sponte, independent of party intentions.241 In determining
foreign law, courts may rely on expert opinions, information
provided by the Federal Ministry of Justice, and
information provided by the parties.242
Similarly, Switzerland puts the primary responsibility
of raising and proving foreign law on courts, not parties.
Under the Federal Private International Law Act of 1987,
the courts determine the content of foreign law on their
own, though courts may request the aid of the parties.243 The
240. BUNDESGESETZ: INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [Austrian International
Private Law Act] BUNDEGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 304/1978, Federal Law
Gazette No. 304/1978, available at http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/.
241. Id. § 4(1) (“Das fremde Recht ist von Amts wegen zu ermitteln.”) (“Foreign
law is to be established by the court.”). However, in a few areas of law the
parties‟ choice of law carries more weight. Id. §2. (“Die für die Anknüpfung an
eine bestimmte Rechstordnung maßgebenden tatsächlichen und rechtlichen
Voraussetzungen sind von Amts wegen festzustellen, soweit nicht nach
verfahrensrechtlichen Vorschriften in einem der Rechtswahl zugängligen
Sachgebiet tatächliches Parteivorbringen für wahr zu halten ist.” (citation
omitted)) (“The court must determine the applicability and content of foreign
law on its own, insofar no other statutes provide that the court must accept as
true party representations.”). See generally Bach & Gruber, supra note 222, at
101-13; Jacob Dolinger, Application, Proof, and Interpretation of Foreign Law: A
Comparative Study in Private International Law, 12 ARIZ. J. OF INT‟L & COMP. L.
225, 234 n.47 (1995) (“[F]oreign applicable law must be applied ex officio.”).
242. BUNDESGESETZ: INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT § 4(1)-(2) (Austria) (“Das
fremde Recht ist von Amts wegen zu ermittlen. Zulässige Hilsmittel hiefür sind
auch die Mitwirkung der Beteiligten, Auskünfte des Bundesministeriums für
Justiz und Sachverständigengutachten. Kann das fremde Recht trotz
eingehendem Bemühen innerhalb angemessener Frist nicht ermittelt werden,
so ist das österreichische Recht anzuwenden.”) (“Foreign law is to be established
by the court. The court may rely on the submissions of the parties, on
information from the Federal Ministry of Justice or on expert reports. If, despite
considerable efforts, foreign law cannot be established within the stipulated
time, Austrian law is then applicable.”).
243. BUNDESGESETZ UBER DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT [IPRG] Dec. 18,
1987, art. 16 cl. 1 (Switz.) (“Der Inhalt des anzuwendenden ausländischen
Rechts ist von Amtes wegen festzustellen. Dazu kann die Mitwirkung der
Parteien verlangt werden.”) (“The court must determine the content of the
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court may place the burden of proving foreign law on the
parties in one limited area of law: patrimonial matters.244
Should the court choose to place this burden on the parties,
their failure to meet the burden will result in the
application of Swiss law.245
3. France. When dealing with foreign law issues,
France, like Germany, places the principal responsibility on
the court. French courts are generally required to apply
foreign law on their own accord, independent of the actions
of the parties.246 The mandatory nature of this command is
reflected in Article 12, section 1 of the Nouveau Code de
Procédure Civile (“N.C.P.C.”). It provides that “the judge
must decide the case according to the rules of law applicable
to it.”247 Under applicable French law, parties cannot dispose
of most of their rights and are bound by the court‟s
determination that foreign law applies.248
applicable foreign law. The court can require the parties to help in this
determination.”), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/291/index.html. See
generally Dolinger, supra note 241, at 234 n.51 (“This orientation had already
been followed by Swiss case law.”); Hartley, supra note 194, at 277-78
(discussing the Swiss approach to pleading and proving foreign law under the
Federal Private International Law Act).
244. IPRG art. 16 cl. 1 (“Bei vermögensrechtlichen Ansprüchen kann der
Nachweis den Parteien überbunden werden.”) (“If the claims involve
patrimonial matters, the court may place the burden of proving foreign law on
the parties.”).
245. See id. art. 16 cl. 2 (“Ist der Inhalt des anzuwendenden ausländischen
Rechts nicht feststellbar, so ist schweizerisches Recht anzuwenden.”) (“Where
the content of the applicable foreign law is not ascertainable, forum law must be
applied.”), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/291/index.html.
246. Samuel Fulli-Lemaire & Daniel Rojas, France, in APPLICATION OF
FOREIGN LAW, supra note 195, at 185, 185-96; Hartley, supra note 194, at 278-82;
Brigitte Herzog, Proof of International Law and Foreign Law Before a French
Judge, 18 VA. J. INT‟L L. 651, 652-53 (1978).
247. NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C] art. 12 cl. 1 (Fr.) (“Le
juge doit trancher le litige conformément aux règles de droit qui lui sont
applicables”.) (“The judge settles the dispute in accordance with the rules of law
applicable thereto.”), available at, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/.
248. See Fulli-Lemaire & Rojas, supra note 246, at 187-88. They may, in short,
not dispose of “droits indisponibles” (“inalienable rights”). Id. However, where a
court intends to consider foreign law, it must inform the parties and give them
opportunity to comment. N.C.P.C. art. 16 cl. 3 (Fr.) (“Il [le juge] ne peut fonder
sa décision sur les moyens de droit qu‟il a relevés d‟office sans avoir au préalable
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Generally this obligation is absolute, and parties have
no input into questions of foreign law.249 However, like their
German counterparts, French courts have allowed small
deviations from this rule in areas of law where party
autonomy looms large.250 There, courts consider the position
of the parties, though they are not bound by them.251
Under the French model, parties cannot bind the court
to apply French law, but they may, in limited
circumstances, release a judge from the obligation to apply
foreign law sua sponte.252
4. Italy. As in France, Italy tasks courts with the
responsibility of raising and determining foreign law.
Traditionally, Italian civil procedure conceived of foreign
law as fact, to be plead and proven by the parties.253 The
modern approach to pleading and proving foreign law is
governed by the Italian Private International Law Act No.
218 of 1995.254 It provides that courts must ascertain
applicable foreign law on their own motion.255 The parties
invité les parties à présenter leurs observations.”) (“He [the judge] shall not base
his decision on legal arguments that he has raised sua sponte without having
first
invited
the
parties
to
comment
thereon.”),
available
at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/.
249. See generally Dolinger, supra note 241, at 226-31 (describing the
fluctuating history in French Courts on these points).
250. Fulli-Lemaire & Rojas, supra note 246, at 186-88.
251. However, the parties may, by express agreement, exclude the application
of foreign law and bind the judge to decide the case based on French substantive
law. N.C.P.C. art. 12 cl. 3 (Fr.) (“Toutefois, il [le juge] ne peut changer la
dénomination ou le fondement juridique lorsque les parties, en vertu d‟un accord
exprès et pour les droits dont elles ont la libre disposition, l‟ont lié par les
qualifications et points de droit auxquels elles entendent limiter le débat”.)
(However, he [the judge] may not change the denomination or legal ground
where the parties, pursuant to an express agreement and in the exercise of such
rights that they may freely alienate, have bound him by legal definitions and
legal arguments to which they intend to restrict debate.”), available at
http.//www.legifrance.gov.fr/.
252. Id.
253. Dolinger, supra note 241, at 232.
254. Legge 31 maggio 1995, n. 218 (It.).
255. Id. art. 14 cl. 1 (“L‟accertamento della legge straniera e compiuto d‟ufficio
dal giudice.”) (“[T]he judge has to ascertain the applicable foreign law ex
officio.”), translated in Andrea Giardina, Italy: Law Reforming the Italian
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are in no way obligated to plead or prove the content of
foreign law.256 Foreign law is thus treated largely like
domestic Italian law. The judge is presumed to know its
content or be capable of ascertaining it. As in Germany, the
judge may consult with experts at specialized institutions
and, as in Austria, the judge may also rely on information
obtained through the Ministry of Justice.257
5. Spain. Like Italy, Spain traditionally conceived of
questions of foreign law as questions of fact, to be plead and
proven by the parties.258 However, also like Italy, Spain
switched to a system that places the principal responsibility
of raising foreign law on courts and shares responsibilities
for proving foreign law between the parties and the court.
Questions of foreign law are now governed by the New
Spanish Code of Civil Procedure of 2001.259 It provides that
it is no longer necessary for the parties to plead foreign law.
Instead, courts will consider and apply it ex officio.260

System of Private International Law, 35 INT‟L LEGAL MATERIALS 760, 765-82
(1996). See Andrea Bonomi, The Italian Statute on Private International Law, 27
INT‟L J. LEGAL INFO. 247, 256 (1999).
256. See Bonomi, supra note 255, at 256 (noting the limited role of the parties
in pleading or proving foreign law).
257. L. n. 218/1995 art. 14 cl. 1 (It.) (“A tal fine questi può avvalersi, oltre che
degli strumenti indicate dale convenzioni internazionali, di informazioni
acquisite per il tramite del Ministero di grazia e giustizia; può altresi
interpellare esperti o istituzioni specializzate.”) (“[To ascertain foreign law], he
[the judge] may use in addition to the instruments referred to in international
conventions, information obtained through the Ministry of Justice, or from
experts or specialized institutions.”), translated in Giardina, supra note 255, at
765-82; see Bonomi, supra note 255, at 256 (noting that Italian judges may seek
assistance from the Ministry of Justice when ascertaining foreign law).
258. See CÓDIGO CIVIL, art. 12 cl. 6 (1974) (Spain); see also José Luis Iglesias et
al., Spain, in APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW, supra note 195, at 355, 355-76.
259. LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CIVIL, [L.E. CIV.] (Spain) (enacted Jan. 1, 2000)
(in force Jan. 8, 2001).
260. Iglesias et al., supra note 258, at 356; see L.E. CIV. art. 281.2 (Spain) (“El
derecho extranjero deberá ser probado en lo que respecta a su contenido y
vigencia, pudiendo valerse el tribunal de cuantos medios de averiguación estime
necesarios para su aplicación.”) (“Foreign law must be examined by the court
with regard to content and validity. To do so, the court may use all means of
inquiry it deems necessary.”).
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The picture becomes more complicated when it comes to
proving foreign law. Here, the parties and the courts both
play a role. Foreign law must be proven, even where the
parties are in agreement on the content of foreign law.261
Either the parties or the court may furnish such proof.
Where the parties prove foreign law, they may utilize public
documents262 or expert opinions.263 Courts may utilize any
means to ascertain the content of foreign law.264 Thus, in
practice, the shared burden of proving foreign law places
the responsibility of offering evidence on the party favored
by the foreign law.
C. The View from Abroad
A comparative perspective on pleading foreign law
shows that there are two basic families of approaches to
divide responsibilities between the parties and the court.
One tradition focuses on adversarial norms and allocates
the obligations for raising and proving foreign law on the
parties. Under this approach the parties determine the
shape of the legal conflict. They are presumed to be the
masters of their own fate. If the parties do not raise
questions of foreign law then courts will not raise them sua
sponte. Under a court-centered approach, the court bears
the responsibility for finding and applying the right law to
the case. The parties might make suggestions to the court,
but in the end the court will make the determination of
which law applies.
Both of these approaches have different strengths and
weaknesses. The adversarial model emphasizes party
autonomy. It gives the parties the agency to resolve their
disputes on terms that they themselves contemplated. The
court-centered model stresses that courts should apply the
correct law to a given situation, independent of the
261. See L.E. CIV. art. 281.2; Iglesias et al., supra note 258, at 355-68.
262. See L.E. CIV. art. 317 (Spain) (“Clases de documentos públicos”)
(governing the use of public records).
263. See id. art. 355 (“Reconocimiento de personas”) (governing the use of
experts).
264. See id. art. 281.2 (“[E]l tribunal de cuantos medios de averiguación estime
necesarios para su aplicación.”) (“[T]he court may use all means of inquiry it
deems necessary [to ascertain foreign law].”); Iglesias et al., supra note 258, at
358-60.
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potentially misguided intentions of the party. Predictability
and accuracy trump party autonomy under this model.
Foreign systems that used to incorporate court-driven
and party-driven features have moved away from hybrid
models towards pure models—for good reason. Adhering
simultaneously to two schemes conceptually and
normatively at odds with each other causes, predictably,
instability and confusion. Recognizing these problems,
courts abroad have eliminated or reduced mixed approaches
to questions of foreign law as much as practicable.
Meanwhile, the U.S. model has been drawing,
increasingly, on both of these models. Predictably, the effect
is a pleading regime that is confusing and inconsistent. The
rise of heightened pleading under Twombly and Iqbal has
intensified pre-existing tensions in the regime for pleading
and proving foreign law.
This Article thus advocates for a clear choice between
the adversarial and court-centered model. The U.S. model
should either return to treating foreign law as fact or fully
endorse treating it as law. It could return to its adversarial
common law roots that are deeply embedded in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the American legal system.265
Or the U.S. system could complete its slow transformation
to a court-centered system initiated with the adoption of
Rule 44.1 and completely endorse court-driven proceedings.
This would be consistent with the recent rise of the
“managerial judge,” concerns about high litigation costs,
and notions of judicial efficiency and accuracy.266 There are
numerous international models of how either might be done
consistently and efficiently. Meanwhile, being stuck in the
middle, between adversarial and court-centered normative
commitments, is not pragmatic; it is incoherent and
unpredictable. As such, both of the conceptually pure
alternatives are preferable (despite their various
265. See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN
WAY OF LAW (2001) (describing the defining adversarial features of the U.S.
legal system).
266. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of
Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 308-10 (1986); Todd D. Peterson, Restoring
Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 4, 63-78 (1995); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 374, 386-413 (1982).
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shortcomings) to a system that combines both and ends up
with the worst of both worlds.
A comparative perspective offers three other solutions
to the conceptual and practical problems that plague the
pleading of foreign law in U.S. courts.
First, the U.S. system could abandon the ideal of transsubstantive procedures. This ideal suggests that the same
procedural regime should govern the adjudications of all
substantive rights.267 Instead, it could endorse adversarial
norms for some pleadings (e.g., patents), but follow more
explicitly court-centered norms in other areas, like foreign
law. This position has the virtue of not assuming that “one
size fits all.”268 Perhaps adversarial norms serve well in
other contexts but are misplaced in the context of pleading
foreign law. Abandoning trans-substantive norms would
thus allow courts to develop a coherent model for pleading
foreign law without unbalancing the pleading regime for
other areas of law. In part, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure already recognize this difference by placing
questions of foreign law in Rule 44.1 instead of Rule 8 or
12.269

267. See David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity
in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376 (2010) (defining transsubstantivity); see also Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of
Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-TransSubstantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2068-69 (1989)
(defending the trans-substantive regime); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery
Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2238 (1989) (suggesting that a revision to the Federal Rules
would likely result in limiting the depth of discovery); Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge
Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective SubstanceSpecific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 41 (1994) (questioning trans-substantive
procedures).
268. See Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedures:
An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
377, 377 (2010).
269. However, this approach has an important limitation. Courts are often
willing to let adversarial norms govern cases where the underlying law is either
difficult to research, in a different language, and where little English-language
research is available. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. In
contrast, they are more confident with court-centered norms where the foreign
law is easily available, researched, and similar to U.S. law. Abandoning transsubstantive procedures does not pick up on these distinctions.
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Second, U.S. courts could follow the example of
Germany and Italy, and allow for certification of questions
of foreign law to a national institute. For example, Germany
has a network of Max Planck Institutes that specialize in
different areas of comparative law.270 These institutes can
provide information to courts that are timely, context
specific, well-researched, and often beyond the linguistic
capacity of the judge.271 They are non-adversarial in
nature.272 As such, they are well-suited for a court-driven
approach to questions of foreign law.
Third, the U.S. system could certify questions to a
foreign court for an advisory opinion.273 This approach has
the benefit of being recognizable to U.S. courts. Many courts
already allow questions of state law arising in cases pending
in another jurisdiction (often federal courts sitting in
diversity) to be certified to the state‟s highest court for
resolution.274 In principle, this system could be made
270. For example, the Institute in Hamburg specializes in foreign private and
private international law. MAX PLANCK INST. FOR COMPARATIVE AND INT‟L
PRIVATE LAW, http://www.mpipriv.de/ww/en/pub/news.cfm (last visited Nov. 12,
2011). Others include: Munich in foreign and international patent, copyright,
and competition law; Heidelberg in public law; Freiburg in criminal law;
Frankfurt in legal history. Max Planck Institutes, MAX-PLANCK-GESELLSCHAFT,
http://www.mpg.de/institutes (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (providing a list of all
institutes).
271. See Bach & Gruber, supra note 222, at 106-07 (“Most [German and
Austrian] courts prefer an expert who is not only familiar with the foreign law,
but also the Austrian or German law or who at least speaks German. In this
case, the danger of misunderstandings—especially that of a misinterpretation of
the questions asked by the court—is limited. Usually both countries‟ courts
commission specialized law professors of Austrian or German law schools with
the preparation of the expert opinion, with German courts often preferring the
Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in
Hamburg.” (footnotes omitted)).
272. The Max Planck Institutes are primarily focused on research. Short
Portrait, MAX-PLANCK-GESELLSCHAFT, http://www.mpg.de/183251/portrait (last
visited Nov. 12, 2011).
273. This would not resolve the question of what law to apply, but once that
question is settled, it could contribute to a coherent court-centered approach to
resolving the content of the foreign law.
274. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 6 § 3(b)(9) (“The court of appeals shall adopt
and from time to time may amend a rule to permit the court to answer questions
of New York law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a
court of appeals of the United States or an appellate court of last resort of
another state, which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the
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compatible with an adversarial system or a court-centered
system (depending on who may move for certification and
how such a certification is subsequently handled). However,
in practice certification will likely give greater control to
courts, at home and abroad.
All of these solutions generate reliable information for
courts and make litigation more predictable. These
solutions also avoid some or all of the conceptual and
practical contradictions that the current hybrid model in the
U.S. suffers. While none is perfect, each offers tools to
overcome the tensions built deep into the current model for
pleading and proving foreign law. A comparative
perspective illustrates these tensions, arising from an
adherence to conflicting underlying norms. Only by choosing
between court-centered and adversarial norms and
procedures can the U.S. regime shed the difficulties that
currently beset invocations of foreign law, a task made all
the more urgent by the recent rise of plausibility pleading.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. regime for pleading and proving foreign law
relies on adversarial and court-centered norms. It borrows
methods and tools from both and it places burdens on
parties and courts based on both norms.
In practice, this gives tremendous discretion to judges.
It also means that results are unpredictable, often
inconsistent, and that the process of litigation is expensive
and cumbersome. More fundamentally, the attempt to
borrow tools from both adversarial and court-centered
systems is conceptually incoherent. The current regime is a
patchwork of rules and guidelines without overarching and
organizing principles.
The rise of the plausibility pleading regime in recent
years has highlighted these practical difficulties and
conceptual tensions. It has given us occasion to re-examine
certifying court and which in the opinion of the certifying court are not
controlled by precedent in the decisions of the courts of New York.”); Local Rules
of the Second Circuit, R. 27.2 (“If state law permits, the court may certify a
question of state law to that state‟s highest court. When the court certifies a
question, the court retains jurisdiction pending the state court‟s response to the
certified question.”), available at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/clerk/Rules/
Rules_home.htm.
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the means of pleading and proving foreign law in U.S.
courts. As Rule 44.1 illustrates, procedures that do not
meaningfully constrain litigants and judges can be
dangerous. The immense flexibility such rules provide is a
liability, not an asset.

